



**DG ECHO**

## **Reports on food security**

Release nº 2 – October 2022

Directorate-General for European Civil  
Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations

*Civil Protection and  
Humanitarian Aid*

## LEGAL NOTICE

This document has been prepared for the European Commission however it reflects the views only of the authors, and the European Commission is not liable for any consequence stemming from the reuse of this publication. More information on the European Union is available on the Internet (<http://www.europa.eu>).

---

PDF/Volume_01	KR-AE-22-001-EN-N	2600-5468
---------------	-------------------	-----------

---

Luxembourg: Publications Office of the European Union, 2022

© European Union, 2022



The reuse policy of European Commission documents is implemented by the Commission Decision 2011/833/EU of 12 December 2011 on the reuse of Commission documents (OJ L 330, 14.12.2011, p. 39). Except otherwise noted, the reuse of this document is authorised under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International (CC-BY 4.0) licence (<https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/>). This means that reuse is allowed provided appropriate credit is given and any changes are indicated.

For any use or reproduction of elements that are not owned by the European Union, permission may need to be sought directly from the respective rightsholders.

# **DG ECHO**

## **Reports on food security**

Release n° 2 – October 2022

## Table of Contents

<b>Executive summary .....</b>	<b>7</b>
<b>1. Global picture .....</b>	<b>9</b>
1.1. How the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the global food crisis .....	12
1.2. Drought in the Horn of Africa and famine forecast in Somalia .....	13
<b>2. Geographical focus .....</b>	<b>14</b>
2.1. West and Central Africa .....	15
2.2. East and Southern Africa .....	33
2.3. Middle East and North Africa (MENA) .....	49
2.4. Latin America and Caribbean.....	59
2.5. Asia and Pacific .....	71

## List of Organisations

DG ECHO	Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid
DG INTPA	Directorate General for International Partnerships
DG NEAR	Directorate General for Neighbourhood and Enlargement Negotiations
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organisation
FCDO	Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office (UK)
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFRC	International Federation of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies
IOM	International Office for Migration
OCHA	United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
OXFAM	Oxford Committee for Famine Relief
UNHCR	United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nations Children's Fund
WFP	World Food Program

## List of acronyms

CCCM	Camp Coordination and Camp Management
COHAFA	Council working party on Humanitarian Aid and Food Aid
CVA	Cash and Voucher Assistance
DREF	Disaster Response Emergency Fund
DRR	Disaster Risk Reduction
EDF	European Development Fund
EiE	Education in Emergencies
ERP	Emergency Response Plan
FSL	Food Security and Livelihoods
GFD	General Food Distribution
GNFC	Global Network Against Food Crises
GRFC	Global Report on Food Crises

HIP	Humanitarian Implementation Plan
HDP	Humanitarian – Development – Peace nexus
HRP	Humanitarian Response Plan
IDP	Internally Displaced Person
IPC/CH	Integrated Food Security Phase Classification
MAM	Moderate Acute Malnutrition
MEB	Minimum Expenditure Basket
MPCT	Multi-purpose Cash Transfer
MSNA	Multi-Sector Needs Assessment
PLW	Pregnant Lactating Women
RHD	Refugee Hosting District
RMRP	Refugee and Migrant Response Plan
RPCA	Food Crisis Prevention Network
RRM	Rapid Response Mechanism
SAM	Severe Acute Malnutrition
SMEB	Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket



## Executive summary

**Food security is deteriorating globally** according to recent analyses from the Global Network against Food Crises (GNFC)<sup>1</sup>. There are currently up to 205 million people acutely food insecure and in need of urgent food assistance (IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent) across 45 countries, twice as many as in 2016<sup>2</sup>. Around 970 000 people worldwide are projected to face catastrophic conditions of food insecurity (IPC/CH Phase 5) in 2022. Specialised agencies warn that hunger is likely to further increase in the immediate to near future in 19 countries or situations.

In 2022, food insecurity was exacerbated by the **direct effects of Russia's invasion of Ukraine** on the global economy, including on food prices, global supply of grains, as well as on the price of energy and fertilisers. These factors compounded food crises that were already raging due to conflicts, weather extremes (notably droughts and flooding resulting from climate change), and economic shocks due to the fallout from the Covid-19 pandemic.

Despite hunger being already on the rise for the past five years, **funding to address this has been lagging behind**<sup>3</sup>. Furthermore, the humanitarian system overly relies on only a limited number of donors.

EU humanitarian assistance is funded through the European Commission's **Directorate General for Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid** (DG ECHO). It is designed and implemented in a nexus approach, whereby synergies between humanitarian, development and peace actions are actively pursued and absolutely necessary. DG ECHO has **reacted swiftly** and decisively to address the hunger crisis by substantially increasing funding for countries most at risk and stepping-up advocacy efforts.

**In 2022 alone, DG ECHO has already allocated over EUR 900 million for humanitarian food assistance, 60% more than in 2021 and almost 80% more than in 2020.** This includes EUR 150 million to be spent in the most vulnerable countries in Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific (ACP), which are part of a broader package of EUR 600 million mobilised from de-committed European Development Fund (EDF) reserves. Furthermore, an additional EUR 395 million recently mobilised from the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserves (SEAR), with a considerable food security component of at least EUR 160 million.

Against this backdrop, the **objectives** of the present report are threefold. Firstly, to provide information on the situation in a set of 21 countries and regions considered of maximum concern from a food security perspective. Secondly, to outline DG ECHO's interventions to meet rising humanitarian needs. And lastly, to identify critical needs and opportunities for coordinated action against food insecurity, with a view to scale-up assistance to the populations most in need. It encapsulates information collected from DG ECHO's field and geographical desks at the end of September 2022 and is intended to provide a more granular picture of the realities from a field perspective. This knowledge is further complemented with references to public sources of information.

---

<sup>1</sup> Global Report on Food Crises mid-year update (13 September 2022) and Hunger Hotspots Report (21 September 2022).

<sup>2</sup> Figure from the latest update of the Global Report on Food Crises (published on 13 September). This figure underestimates the actual needs, as the update covers eight countries less than the previous report (covering 2021). If we add the 2021 figures for these eight countries, the total figure would be above 220 million people.

<sup>3</sup> Latest data available (GNFC).



This report provides detailed information about the six hunger hotspots as identified by the GNFC, namely **Somalia, Yemen, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, South Sudan, and Nigeria**, as they all have populations facing or projected to face starvation (Catastrophe, IPC/CH Phase 5) or that are at serious risk of deterioration due to critical food insecurity (Emergency, IPC/CH Phase 4). In addition to these, the report covers the **Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Haiti, Kenya, Uganda, Sudan, Syria, Lebanon, the Central African Republic (CAR), the Sahel region (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad), Zimbabwe, Madagascar, Mozambique, Central America, Venezuela, Colombia**, where the GNFC warns about the possible intensification of life-threatening conditions in the coming months.

Climate change and related weather extremes remain a key driver of food insecurity in many of the countries under analysis, **such as Kenya, Madagascar, and Somalia, where extreme droughts** are causing crops to deteriorate and harvests to fail. **Floods and irregular rains in Niger, Mauritania, Chad, Mozambique, and Zimbabwe**, for example, are bringing about similar consequences.


Many countries are affected by high inflation, notably on food prices. Critical cases include, for instance, **Venezuela**, with an estimated inflation of 155%; **Burkina Faso**, where national average prices are 23% (rice) to 70% (sorghum) higher than the average for 2021 and the last 5 years, reaching up to 150 % in some conflict areas (the situation is similar in Mali); **and Lebanon**, where the prices of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) in August 2022 had increased by 1757%, compared to October 2019.

Lastly, escalating internal and regional conflicts continue to have a disproportionate impact on food security (alongside its four pillars of availability, access, utilisation and stability), as well as on livelihoods, markets access, crop yields and the provision of essential services. This translates into the higher numbers of severely food insecure people. In this respect, countries like **Burkina Faso, Mali, Nigeria, Ethiopia, Mozambique and Haiti** – among others – have been gravely affected.

Most of the countries under analysis are faced with multiple overlapping challenges at the same time: high food inflation, displacement, increasing insecurity, prolonged effects of the Covid-19 pandemic, structural poverty and lack of governance are only some of the additional causes contributing to the exacerbation of the global food crisis.

## 1. Global picture

On the 12<sup>th</sup> of September, an update of the Global Report on Food Crises (GRFC) was published, providing the most recent and detailed picture of the global food insecurity situation. This report estimates at **205 million** the number of people in need of food assistance, compared to 193 million at the end of 2021. Despite the increase, this report does not provide a full picture, as it covers 45 countries only (compared to the 53 covered in the previous one) due to the lack of recent analysis in some countries. If we only consider the 45 countries covered by the update, the number of people in acute food insecurity has increased by 21% since the last report covering 2021<sup>4</sup>.




Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

This is the highest figure since the GRFC is published and confirms a daunting trend: the number of people in acute food insecurity has increased systematically since the first edition of the report (covering the year 2016), and the current figures are double those of 2016.

The most significant increases in food insecurity were observed in Nigeria, Somalia, and Yemen. Ten countries recorded an increase of more than 50% in the numbers of people in food crisis. The largest crises in absolute terms are the Democratic Republic of Congo, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Nigeria, and Yemen.


### Seven countries/territories saw an increase of over 1 million people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above between 2021 and 2022



Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022


<sup>4</sup> If figures from the previous report for the eight missing countries are added, the total figure would be above 220 million.

## Numbers of people in IPC/CH Phase 3 or above or equivalent in 45 countries/territories in 2022




Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

We note a very strong deterioration and acceleration of food insecurity in West Africa and in particular in the Sahel: +48% and +153% of people in food crisis (phase 3 and +), compared to 2021 and the average of the last 5 years, with a greater and worrying increase of people in phase 4 (Emergency phase or "pre-famine" phase): +72% and +228% versus 2021 and the average of the last 3 years.




Source: ECHO



Source: ACLED

### Cereal Prices Trend in West Africa Sahel




Source: CILSS

Note that the figures in these graphs concern average trends of food price at regional level. In conflict areas, especially Burkina Faso, our field partners report shortages of staple foods in several markets and price increases of around 150%, compared to last year and the last 5 years.

Not only global numbers, but also the severity of hunger remain very high, with around 39 million people in Emergency levels of food insecurity (IPC phase 4, second highest in the scale) and almost 500 000 people in catastrophe level in four countries (IPC phase 5, highest in the scale).

In the latest Hunger Hotspots report, published in September, five countries were considered to be at risk of famine: Ethiopia, Nigeria, South Sudan, Yemen, Afghanistan, and Somalia. However, it is important to point out that famine conditions are already predominantly in the region, even without a formal declaration.




Source: Global Report on Food Crises, Sept 2022

The drivers of food insecurity remain conflict, global and local economic shocks, and weather extremes, added to a background of poverty and inequality. In the last years, the successive effects of the COVID-19 pandemic and the Russian invasion of Ukraine have accelerated the trend.

### 1.1. How the Russian invasion of Ukraine has exacerbated the global food crisis

The ripple effects of the Russian invasion of Ukraine on global food security have been extensively discussed, and projections have been made by several organisations, but so far, they haven't been objectively measured. The picture provided by the GRFC update, despite being published in September, doesn't fully capture these effects, as many of the analyses on which it is based were carried out before these effects were fully visible. The next edition of the GRFC should provide a more precise estimation of this impact which should also be associated with an analysis of the (speculative) mode of operation of international markets.

The most obvious effect of the invasion has been the increase in global food prices. Before the invasion, these were already at a ten-year high due to the economic effects of Covid-19. The invasion further increased prices, as both Russia and Ukraine were major food exporters, and together provided one third of global cereal supply, and 80% of global sunflower oil. February reached the highest level since its inception in 1990.



Source: FAO

Food prices stabilised in the second quarter of the year and decreased to pre-invasion levels after the signature of the Black Sea Grain Initiative in July. However, as of September 2022, food prices (measured through the FAO Food Price Index) were 5.5% higher than one year earlier. Furthermore, the Initiative is unlikely to fully stabilise markets, as quantities exported remain low, the situation in the Black Sea remains fragile as recent events testify, and global trade patterns have been significantly altered. Food prices are thus expected to remain volatile and high in the next couple of years.

Beyond food prices, the Russian invasion is also impacting food security through its negative effect on the prices of energy and fertiliser – which were already very high before the invasion.



Countries that were highly dependent on grain and oil imports from the Black Sea region were the first to suffer the effects of the crisis. The cost-of-living crisis that followed is affecting particularly low-income, food-importing countries with macroeconomic difficulties and limited coping capacities. This includes many countries in the MENA region and Sub-Saharan Africa, some of which were already facing serious food crises.

Soaring food and fuel prices may compromise the ability of humanitarian actors to supply food to the areas with the direst needs. WFP estimated that their operational costs would increase by EUR 26.1 per month in 2022, compared to pre-invasion levels, and EUR 63.8 million per month compared to pre-pandemic levels.


This is leading to a reduction of food assistance, which would further aggravate some of the world's worst food crises.

The effects are expected to continue into next year: in 2022, fertiliser prices have increased significantly, and around 30% of the agricultural land will remain unharvested or not planted this year in Ukraine. The World Bank anticipates that energy prices will rise more than 50% in 2022, before easing in 2023 and 2024. This will certainly have a negative impact on agricultural productivity in the next planting seasons. It is estimated that the decline in fertiliser use alone could reduce food production by 20% in Africa.

## 1.2. Drought in the Horn of Africa and famine forecast in Somalia

On 5 September 2022, the Famine Review Committee forecasted that a famine would occur in two districts of Somalia. Unless urgent action is taken, a formal declaration of famine could happen before the end of the year, likely to last until March. This is mainly the consequence of the persistent drought in the Horn of Africa, but also decades of conflict, severe economic shocks, and mass population displacement.

The drought in the Horn of Africa started in 2020 and has stretched over four rainy seasons, making it the most extensive and severe in four decades. It has caused a dramatic increase of acute food insecurity in the three countries, affecting up to 19-21 million people. It has also caused over 1.5 million displacements and originated the first famine declaration in five years.



The current rainy season (October – December 2022) is also being below average in certain areas. Due to this, the number of people in need of urgent food assistance could increase to an estimated 23-26 million people, including more people in famine-like situation.

Source: IPC

## 2. Geographical focus

This section compiles intelligence about the main food crises from the DG ECHO field network and geographical units. For each country, highlights are provided regarding the status and evolution of food insecurity, the main underlying factors, and the main interventions of DG ECHO and other actors. Finally, some ideas for action are put forth, including opportunities for a reinforced HDP nexus.

Among these, increasing humanitarian funding and better targeting is suggested for most countries. Many opportunities for nexus are identified, including coordination with agricultural, livelihood and resilience activities; links with social protection schemes; etc.

Other recurrent recommendations relate to:

- Improving the efficiency of aid through e.g., more rapid and anticipatory action approaches systematic and use of cash transfers.
- Improving data and information systems and analyses (more integrated/common analyses).
- Reinforcing advocacy on a variety of issues (increased funding, respect of IHL, etc).

Examples of these are:

- Support initiatives for synergy/complementarity and coordination of INTPA - ECHO funding such as in the Sahel, Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.
- Support nexus initiatives in the CAR, through joint financing and strong coordination. To this end, continue to coordinate with the EU Delegation on the possible reprogramming of unspent budget support to redirect it to resilience and food security funding.
- Advocate both internally and externally to donors for increased engagement on Yemen.
- Advocating with other EU services and donors for increased engagement in Syria for integrated programming that boosts ability of people to earn a living. Livelihoods programmes, including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services.

More granular detail is provided in the country fiches below.

NOTE: To describe the food insecurity status, these fiches use the Integrated Phase Classification (IPC) scale, which is the most broadly used framework. This scale classifies food insecurity in five levels (see below). Expressions like “IPC 3+” are frequently used, meaning “IPC 3 and higher”.

In West African countries, IPC can be referred to as CH (Cadre Harmonisé). CH is an analogous system, considered fully compatible with IPC. Hence, CH and IPC phases can be considered equivalent and are often referred to as the IPC/CH framework.



### Qualifying Levels of Acute Food Insecurity Using the Reference Table for Area Classification

	Mild acute food insecurity		High acute food insecurity		Critical acute food insecurity	
Phase name and description	Phase 1 None/Minimal	Phase 2 Stressed	Phase 3 Crisis	Phase 4 Emergency	Phase 5 Catastrophe/ Famine	
	Households are able to meet essential food and non-food needs without engaging in atypical and unsustainable strategies to access food and income.	Households have minimally adequate food consumption but are unable to afford some essential non-food expenditures without engaging in stress-coping strategies.	Households either: • Have food consumption gaps that are reflected by high or above-usual acute malnutrition; or • Are marginally able to meet minimum food needs but only by depleting essential livelihood assets or through crisis-coping strategies.	Households either: • Have large food consumption gaps which are reflected in very high acute malnutrition and excess mortality; or • Are able to mitigate large food consumption gaps but only by employing emergency livelihood strategies and asset liquidation.	Households have an extreme lack of food and/or other basic needs even after full employment of coping strategies. Starvation, death, destitution and extremely critical acute malnutrition levels are evident.  (For Famine Classification, area needs to have extreme critical levels of acute malnutrition and mortality.)	
Priority response objectives	Action required to build resilience and for disaster risk reduction	Action required for disaster risk reduction and to protect livelihoods	Urgent action required to:  Protect livelihoods and reduce food consumption gaps		Save lives and livelihoods	Revert/prevent widespread death and total collapse of livelihoods

Source : IPC


## 2.1. West and Central Africa

### Burkina Faso

#### Situation and evolution


Food security continues to deteriorate in Burkina Faso. In the March 2022 CH/IPC (before the aggression against Ukraine), there is an increase of 20 % of people food insecure IPC/CH3+ expected in the lean season versus 2021, +112% on the last 5-year average, reaching 3.45 million people, with an increase of 82% of people in IPC phase 4 (628 464 people). This is the highest caseload since the CH/IPC analyses of 2015. 179 000 children also require life-saving nutrition treatment. The closure and reduction of functionality of health centres (183 closed, 363 minimally functioning) affects more than 1.5 million people. The inflationary situation experienced by Burkina Faso (one of highest in West Africa) since 2021's harvest continues to worsen. Despite the start of the harvest period, which is usually synonymous with lower food prices, national average prices are still 23% (rice) to 86% (sorghum) higher than the average for 2021 and the last 5 years.

**Graphique 4** : Évolution du prix moyen au détail du sorgho sur le plan national




Source: SONAGESS

In areas of very high insecurity and/or blockade (notably in the Sahel region), 53% of people are in food insecurity, including 21% in a humanitarian emergency with unprecedented severity levels. Food prices are higher than the national average and can reach increases of +67% to +100% for oil, +67% to +80% for millet and +70% to +80% for sugar. Our partners report a shortage of staple food in most markets in conflict affected areas and price increases on average by around 150% compared to the last five years. Conflict intensified in recent months with an increase in towns and populations under blockade/without food (Djibo: 300 000 people, Solan, etc.) due to both non-State armed groups activism and government restrictions (more than 96 trucks were destroyed in a single attack last September). OCHA estimates that 1 million people reside in 13 blockaded areas. More and more emergency assistance must be provided by expensive helicopter operations in a context of limited resources and access. Landlocked areas and/or areas outside State control represent 40% of the territory. By the end of September, the lean season response has reached only 21% of IPC4 and 55% of IPC3 beneficiaries.




Source: OCHA



The Minimum Food Expenditure Basket (MFEB) cost increased by over 27% since the beginning of 2022. The Government has put in place measures to limit the prices of local cereals and some basic necessities by reducing some taxes but without much effect, nor respect by traders. It also plans to assist more than 3.3 million people. The national lean season response plan assisted only 11% of the 1 million people targeted (World Bank funding). The WFP targets 1.7 million people with reduced rations of 50 to 75% depending on localities but reaches only 60% of intended beneficiaries. A USD 138 million net funding requirement was announced in July 2022 by WFP. In September, the rapid response capacities of ECHO's partners to displaced people were fully exhausted.

Despite a good rainy season, the agricultural campaign took place in a context marked by persistent civil insecurity, sabotage of road infrastructure, hard-to-reach areas with difficulties in supplying agricultural inputs, abandonment of cultivated areas. Agricultural deficits are expected particularly in conflict areas (North, Centre North and East). A decrease in cereal production of 8% is expected on average compared to 2021 (already 10% lower compared to the five-year average). These trends remain to be confirmed at the end of the season and should be put into perspective in conflict zones given the difficulties of access to fields. Results of the November CH/IPC analyses may reveal further worsening of the situation.



## Drivers

The intensification of conflict and the insecurity with targeting of civilians, food and markets blockage by non-state armed groups using starvation as a weapon of war, the gap of humanitarian access, internal displaced people (more than 1.7 million people) are the main direct and indirect drivers of the food and nutritional crisis, aggravated by political instability. Other factors are the significant agricultural and pastoral deficits in 2021 at the national and sub-regional levels, and the rise in national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since 2021. The price of hydrocarbons and transport have also risen, and more than doubled in blockaded areas. The war in Ukraine has only exacerbated inflation and speculation. The high insecurity on the roads (improvised explosive devices, illegal controls and detentions, thefts, and other attacks) and destruction of infrastructure also led to a very strong negative impact on the markets and access to beneficiaries.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- About EUR 50 million have been released to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response, including 6.5 million from EDF, 2 million from the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR), a mobilisation of EUR 3 million under the EHRC to support a 3 months air bridge operation and of the Small-Scale Tool for displacements totalling EUR 0.3 million. Upcoming: transfer of funds of EUR 1 million from Luxembourg to DG ECHO and discussion in progress with Austria about a contribution of EUR 0.8 million.
- Food assistance (41%), health and nutrition (12%) and protection (11%) are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.
- EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with the Global Network Against Food Crises - GNFC, OECD, Club du Sahel) a high-level Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasised as well as the underfunded response. EUR 2.5 billion were mobilised for the sub-region including funds already planned/allocated and for non-humanitarian responses that do not target households in food crisis.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: FPI, PDU and Pasanda's (closing) programs
- USAID/BHA: USD 110 million including USD 40 million top up for food assistance in June-July 2022.
- World Bank support to WFP and Ministry for Humanitarian Action with USD 388 million.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund, starting in 2023.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The triple crisis affecting Burkina Faso (conflict, food insecurity, political instability) requires scaling up the response to essential basic needs including minimum dietary requirements of vulnerable displaced and hosts communities, despite the operational constraints.
- Severely underfunded crisis. Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups including new IDP's and refugees.
- Increase the efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas, in a nexus perspective.
- Operationalise the HDP nexus on EUR 150 million budget support reprogramming for resilience and the early recovery of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).



## **Central African Republic (CAR)**

### *Situation and evolution*

After a peak of violence during the post-electoral crisis in 2021, the situation has stabilised, but activities of armed groups persist widely, exacerbating an already fragile and tense socio-economic situation, with the most affected areas being the Northwest, Central, and Eastern regions.

Currently there are 484 335 IDPs recorded in the country, the vast majority (75%) staying with hosting families/relatives. This is an important decrease compared with a year ago (> 700 000 IDPs during the post-electoral crisis), partly related to recent data updates of IDP presence in hard-to-reach areas.

2.6 million people are currently in IPC Phase 3 to 5 over the period September 2022 to March 2023 (September 2022 IPC), which represents 44% of the total population analysed. The projected figure for the period of April to August 2023 is 3 million people in IPC 3 to 5, representing 49% of the total population. This represents an increase compared with the number of people in crisis or emergency reported in 2021 (2.3 million). However, this increase is partly due to an update on the population analysed, going from 4.9 million of people analysed in April 2022 to 6.1 million people analysed in September 2022 due to more sub-prefectures analysed and to an update of the demographic projections of the population released by ICASSES, the national institute of statistics. 19 sub-prefectures are classified as IPC Phase 4 Emergency, with 641 000 people nationwide classified as Phase 4 emergency with immediate “risk of mortality”.

This year, the lean season is taking place in a particularly deteriorated economic context, due to the global impact of the Russian aggression in Ukraine. As a result of the global inflation on food and fuel prices, the authorities have restricted cereal exports, fuel shortages (and confiscation by the authorities) have happened and the cost of transporting foodstuffs has soared. Market prices on basic foodstuffs have been impacted with significant increases between June and July 2022 for casava (+20%), rice (+17%) and maize (+5%), which are the main staples. The increased cost of fertilisers will also affect further the resilience of the affected populations, through lower agricultural output in the next agricultural season.

### *Drivers*

The protracted crisis which started in CAR has structurally undermined productivity in the agricultural sector, because of the lack of investment in rural infrastructure and agricultural inputs. Logistical challenges are also major obstacles to the production and commercialisation/ distribution of food.

Recurrent violence and resulting displacements continue to reduce the resilience and livelihood opportunities of the communities affected by these fluid conflict dynamics. These long-term drivers are now being exacerbated by the current shocks of the global impact of the war in Ukraine and of the reduction or suspension in development aid, especially budget support, owing to the political situation in CAR (concerns over the regime’s reliance for security on Russia’s private military contractor Wagner).

The pressure on the national budget is reinforced by the rising cost of essential goods acquired on the international market and which are subsidised by the government (e.g., fuel) – the risks of State bankruptcy are real, and discontent is growing within the population.

*Ongoing interventions***ECHO interventions**

- EUR 17 million has been allocated under the HIP 2022.
- Actions mitigating food insecurity represent 24% (EUR 4 million of the ECHO portfolio, followed by Education in Emergencies (21%), health (11%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (RRM 10%).
- EDF funding to address the consequences of the war against Ukraine on global food insecurity has been confirmed. DG ECHO budget for emergency food assistance in CAR includes an additional EUR 4 million allocated to WFP (multi-country project).

**Other actors' main interventions**

- In CAR, US/BHA is by far the largest humanitarian donor. In 2022, so far, BHA contributed to the HRP with USD 181 million of which 37.6% (USD 154 million) is for food security. The HRP for CAR (USD 461 million) is currently funded at 78.3%, the funding response to the food security sector for 2022 is currently reaching 93.3%.

*Needs and opportunities*


- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, through EDF funding for emergency assistance in the food sector in CAR.
- Ensure immediate support during the crop season to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery.
- Support nexus initiatives, through joint financing and strong coordination including with the EU Delegation on the possible reprogramming of unspent budget support to redirect it to resilience and food security.

**Chad***Situation and evolution*

2.1 million people were in IPC Phase 3 in Chad during the 2022 lean season (June to August) which represents an increase of 18% compared to 2021, including 101,000 people in Phase 4 - Emergency. In the current lean season, the needs are particularly high in the Lake region (153 000 in IPC3+), in the Sahelian belt (844 000 people in IPC3+) and in the border areas with Cameroon. A total of 24 departments are projected to be in Phase 3 during the 2022 lean season.

As for the nutrition sector, admissions have followed the deteriorating trend observed since March, with 109% of the annual admission target achieved by the end of August. Six provinces have exceeded their annual targets, namely Lac (307.3%), Kanem (101.3%), N'Djamena (143.3%), Ouaddaï (107.7%), Salamat (101.9%) and Sila (135%).

The graph below compares the situation of admissions for Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) in Chad in 2022 compared to the average for the past 5 years.



Source: ECHO

In the Sahel belt region, demand outweighs supply, and is focused on own consumption. Food supply comes mainly from the southern parts of the country, also in production deficit this year, which has a strong impact on price trends. The war in Ukraine affects basic food prices and generates a lack of access to agricultural inputs for the rural communities. This limits production capacities in 2022 and therefore the ability of vulnerable households to recover from this crisis. The pastoral situation is very precarious, with the late installation of pastures in 2022 in addition to the poor rainy season in 2021 and the pressure on natural resources caused by transhumant herders arriving in the Sahel impacts coexistence among the communities. The situation in the Lake Chad region is characterised by a significant number of internally displaced people, with 381 289 people in total. Insecurity has not abated: 1 331 incidents have been reported from January to August 2022. 35 184 refugees from the Far North of Cameroon who came in late 2021 are still in host communities in N'Djamena and in camps around the capital.

Moreover, the unprecedented floods of the 2022 rainy season, that affected almost 1 million people in 18 provinces out of 23, have destroyed 79 000 homes, 465 000 hectares of land and 19 400 head of cattle. The Chadian government has put a contingency plan in place and is working with humanitarian actors to meet the needs of flood-affected populations. In addition to the multiple spontaneous relocation sites that have cropped up in N'Djamena and surrounding areas, three official camps have been set up in and around the capital where an estimated 88 590 individuals have been registered as of the end of October, with more expected.

Chad is one of the 6 pilot countries of the EU Triple Nexus approach. FAO and WFP already benefit from a EUR 44 million program (P2RSA) by DG INTPA in support of food security and nutrition (for example through the local production of fortified flours), social protection, as well as local governance and cohesion.

### Drivers

Persistent violence in Chad and in bordering countries continues to cause displacements. According to the latest DTM and UNHCR data, Chad registers some 574 833 refugees (Sudan, CAR, Cameroon, Nigeria), 381 289 IDPs, and 101 551 returnees.

The lack of rain in 2021 had significantly affected the agricultural and fodder production, aggravating the already critical food situation of the most vulnerable and the conflict-affected households. The most common coping strategies are the sale of livestock, the sale of productive and non-productive assets, and the migration of one or more household members.



The 2022 rainy season has recorded historical above-average rainfalls and resulting floods affecting 1 million people which might affected the food security situation of thousands during the upcoming months.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 48 million allocated in 2022, including among main sectors: health and nutrition (23%), food assistance (34%) and Rapid Response Mechanism (13%). 43% of the RRM is allocated to food assistance, bringing total food assistance to around EUR 19 million (40%).
- DG ECHO is also supporting the Food Security Cluster at national and Lac Province level.
- Including EDF de-committed funds, the DG ECHO budget for emergency food assistance in Chad is now EUR 7.5 million.
- ECHO has activated both DREF and ALERT (Activation Small Scale Tool) emergency response mechanisms to provide additional assistance to the flooding affected population.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- US/BHA is the other main donor to fund emergency food assistance and has recently approved a significant top-up of USD 25 million to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis.
- WFP has launched a USD 95 million appeal for emergency funding to assist Sudanese and Central African refugees for the next 6 months with a pipeline break currently planned for November 2022. Additionally, WFP still needs USD 12.3 million to assist flood-affected populations in urgent need of food assistance.
- Other donors and pool funds have confirmed their contributions to respond to the consequences of flooding: CERF, Start Fund, BHA, CDCS, GAC.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Continue to improve prioritisation of assistance, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Also, as part of the nexus approach, advocate for immediate support to crop production to ensure a better agricultural production level and a rapid recovery, in complementarity with emergency food assistance.

## ***Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)***

### *Situation and evolution*

A staggering 26.4 million people in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) are estimated to be highly food insecure. This includes 3.8 million people at emergency level (IPC 4). Although the number of people classified as food insecure has decreased compared to the last CPI, the situation remains worrying, and the DRC still tops the ranking of countries with a large number of people affected. Agricultural productivity is low in the

DRC. Structural poverty and under-development, poor infrastructure and poor governance that limit agricultural and economic activities in rural areas, livestock, and agricultural pests, forced displacement due to conflict, weather conditions and climate change, as well as recurrent epidemics, contribute to the alarming food insecurity. In addition, the lack of appropriate and accessible/affordable health care, access to clean water, availability of sanitary infrastructure, knowledge as well as insufficient nutritional support mechanisms contribute to the fact that an estimated 2.5 million children under five years of age suffer from global acute malnutrition.

According to the last market price update from August 2022, the median cost of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (MEB) for all assessed territories is relatively high compared to July (+4%), with the exception of North Kivu province, where the median MEB was slightly stable. The high cost of fuel, particularly following the Russian invasion in Ukraine and poor conditions of rural agricultural feeder roads, have influenced the increase in the transport cost and consequently the prices of food products. (REACH ICSM August 2022 and IPC - July 2022).

### *Drivers*

Armed and inter-community conflicts affect mainly five of the 26 provinces of the DRC. 5.53 million people are internally displaced (IDP) and over 96 % of displacement is conflict driven. This figure does not consider the new displaced persons following the new inter-community conflict which broke out in July 2022 in the territory of Kwamouth (Mai-Ndombe province, western DRC) where several thousands of displaced people are reported. Preliminary reports indicate that these displaced people face significant food needs.

Insecurity does not allow farmers to till their land, access markets, etc. IDPs depend on host populations and humanitarian aid, including food assistance.

The DRC is severely under-developed, with all related consequences, including the absence or poor conditions of roads, which keeps many rural communities isolated, limiting their access to markets and essential social services. The DRC's human capital index stands at 0.37 – meaning a Congolese child born today can only hope to achieve 37 % of its potential. The rate of stunting in the DRC is one of the highest in sub-Saharan Africa, and malnutrition is the underlying cause of almost half of the deaths of children under five.

Three quarters of the Congolese population – 60 million people – live on less than USD 1.90 a day, according to the World Bank. Seven out of ten Congolese live in rural areas, mostly subsistence farmers in conditions of precariousness and poverty. Increases in food prices have further reduced the purchasing power of the Congolese population.

The DRC is prone to numerous natural disasters, including volcanic eruptions, earthquakes, flooding, landslides, and drought, as well as epidemics, which have become more frequent in recent years. The Congo River Basin is expected to be heavily affected by climate change, with rising temperatures and extreme weather events, such as floods.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- Initial allocation of EUR 44 million in 2022, including one third on Food Security and Livelihoods (including Multipurpose Cash Transfers - MPCT, which accounts for the large majority) and 5.5 % for nutrition. Current budget stands at EUR 54.4 million, partly delivered through DG ECHO funded rapid response projects/mechanism. ECHO Humanitarian Food Assistance focuses on newly emerging needs linked to conflict and recent displacements. The EUR 14.5 million allocated to FSL/MPCT represents 1.9 % of the FSL needs for the DRC according to the Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP), and the EUR 2.5 million in nutrition less than one % of the nutrition needs described in the HRP.

## Other actors

- US funding stands at USD 426.3 million, representing 68.4 % of all HRP funding so far in 2022).


## Needs and opportunities

The 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan for the DRC requires USD 1.88 billion. It was 37 % funded on 19 October 2022, according to OCHA. WFP needs USD 151 million for its emergency response to cover the period September 2022 to February 2023. The total 2022 funding requirements are USD 645 million.

There is a need to develop a clearer picture of nexus opportunities, and possible links with humanitarian interventions.

## Mali

### Situation and evolution



The country faces an important deterioration of its food security situation in 2022 with a 41% increase of food insecure people (IPC/CH3+) during the lean season in comparison to 2021 (an 84% increase in comparison to the last 5-year average). More than 1.8 million people are food insecure, including 157 000 in pre-famine situation (IPC 4).

According to the WFP Hunger Map (August 2022), 63% of Malians (12 million people) have insufficient food consumption, which represents an increase of more than 2 million people in the last 3 months; and 32% (6.3 million people) have adopted crisis feeding strategies. 3.4 million people need humanitarian nutrition assistance, of which 309 000 severe acute malnourished children need immediate live-saving assistance. Despite the harvests, the prices of basic foodstuffs continue to rise. In September 2022, the price of millet increased by 8% compared to last month, by 122% compared to last year and by 106% compared to the average of the last five years.


Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

Millet and sorghum prices are the highest since August 2013. The increase in the value of the Minimum Expenditure Basket varies from +17% (national average) to +33% (insecure and conflict areas). Increased cost of fuel (+ 24% in August since January) impacts food prices and cost of assistance.

The crisis is critically underfunded (only 30.5% of Mali HRP was funded at the time of reporting), with critical gaps in food security and nutrition sectors. WFP announced a 64% pipeline gap for all kind of Emergency Food Assistance as of September 2022 until January 2023. 1.8 million people were identified by the CH in November 2021 in severe food insecurity during the lean season (May to September) which is fairly underestimated given that there was no update of the analysis in March 2022 and the deterioration in security and price levels. At the end of September, 98% of the people received assistance but with reduced rations. The State was able to distribute 22 713 tonnes of cereals (i.e. 67% achievement). However, nearly 31 123 people were unable to obtain a quick response. Only 30% of the planned households received support in terms of livelihood.

The security and humanitarian situation have particularly worsened in the north and centre of the country, while insecurity keeps spreading further south notably Sikasso. Violence against civilians has increased by almost 50% in 2022 compared to 2021. In September 2022, the number of internally displaced reached another peak since the crisis in 2012 with over 440 000 individuals. The situation is very worrying in Gao with continuous arrivals from Ansongo, Talataye, Tessit and Menaka. Children represent 63% of the internally displaced population.

A significant increase in the prevalence of severe acute malnutrition (sometimes doubled) in 2022 has been reported in many regions notably those in conflict (Gao, Timbuktu, Taoudeini) compared to 2021 with a national average above the emergency threshold.



Source: ECHO

The first agricultural campaign monitoring results show a rather favourable agro-pastoral season in 2022 with cumulative rainfall greater than or equal to normal. An increase in cereal production of + 6% and + 25% is expected on average compared to 2021 and the average of the last 5 years. These trends remain to be confirmed at the end of the season and should be put into perspective in conflict zones given the difficulties of access to fields, the low yields in these zones and the dependence of IDPs on assistance.

International partners have largely put their development cooperation with the government on hold, with negative effect on financial assistance for the poorest and most vulnerable population.

### Drivers

Worsening conflict, violence against civilians, and extension of conflict-affected areas are the main drivers of food insecurity: limited access to market for population and providers, high and increasing insecurity and irregular controls on the main commercial roads, destruction of land, crops and livelihood by armed actors, restriction of access to land, etc. The crisis was aggravated in 2022 by a historic deficit in agro-pastoral production in 2021 (-15% and -10% compared to the 2020 campaign and the last five years) at the national and sub-regional level.

The rise of national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since the end of 2021 has a significant impact. ECOWAS sanctions on Mali (linked to the political situation) from January to June 2022 and increased insecurity added additional layers to price inflation. General inflation 2022 is estimated at 7% by the World Bank.

The country is dependent on imports (14% for cereals, 25% for fuel) and affected by the Russian war in Ukraine. In 2019, wheat imports from the two countries accounted for 40% of total wheat imports (accounting for 60% of all cereal imports). Mali imports around a quarter of its fertiliser from Russia and Belarus. The lack of fertiliser, or delay in provision this year, could have an impact on production and economic/ food insecurity situation in 2023.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 47.3 million allocated in 2022, including EUR 2 million contribution from Italy, 6 million from EDF and 1 million from SEAR being contracted.
- Rapid Multi-sectoral Response (44%) (including food assistance, shelter, wash and NFI); health/nutrition (28%); food assistance (12%); protection (5%); and education (6%). DG ECHO increasingly provides aid through cash and vouchers interventions.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU delegation: EUR 62.5 million including PDU programs in rural areas in 2022.
- USAID/BHA: USD 75 million including 15-32 million top up for food assistance in 2022.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Additional short and long-term financial support and scaling up of the response is required for more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance: functionality of basic services, livelihood and productive support, infrastructure, durable solutions for long-term Internally Displaced Persons, etc.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Mali, and advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Mali.
- Opportunities for nexus are limited due to the political crisis and security environment, with the almost total suspension of development cooperation by EU and EU MS.

## **Mauritania**

### *Situation and evolution*


In Mauritania more than 20% of the population is facing food crisis or worse, approx. 879 000 people). In March 2022, an increase of 82% of food insecure IPC/CH3+ people were expected during the lean season versus 2021, or +74% as compared to the last 5-year average, with an increase of 285% of people in CH4 (83 000 people). These projections were made before the Russian aggression against Ukraine, with Mauritania being highly reliant on food imports. Malnutrition is of concern but prevalence has remained stable for decades. In spite of good forecasts for the agro-pastoral campaign and the State's willingness to encourage a "return" to farming, other factors such as floods occurring since end of July and high prices of food, fertilisers and energy have tempered these positive trends.

In September 2022, a slight drop in the price of certain food products was observed by our field partners compared to August (from -4 to -17% for local sorghum and rice) except for wheat, corn, and the bean on the rise (+ 2, + 4 and + 17%), the cost of the bottom basket remains however at a very slight increase or decrease depending on the region.




	Products	% Variations August/September	
		Hodh el Gharbi	Gorgol and Brakna
<b>Cereals and legumes</b>	Blé	2%	11%
	Petit mil	-17%	-20%
	Sorgo Taghalit	-4%	-5%
	Sorgo Bichna	-5%	-5%
	Sorgo R'haya	-4%	-5%
	Maïs local	4%	8%
	Riz brisure importé	-5%	2%
	Riz brisure local	-14%	1%
	Farine de blé	4%	-
	Niébé	17%	9%
	Blé sac 50KG	0%	-
	Farine sac 50KG	0,5%	1%
	Panier Alimentaire locale	0.7%	6%
	<b>Improved terms of trade (sheep/cereals)</b>	<b>+17% of food</b>	<b>2.8%</b>

#### National average prices



Source: ECHO

## Evolution of average food basket price



Source: ECHO

The government was not able to sustain fuel and gas subsidies, which led to fuel price increase (+50%, so far stable for more than a decade) and associated social tensions.

The response to the food crisis is expected to cover almost 80% of the people in need. Assistance is delivered by the Government (62%), WFP (33%), NGOs (5%). The food basket could not be revised upwards to take into account significant price increases, due to lack of funding. Coverage and duration of the assistance (4-month support) were prioritised over the level of assistance (about 36% of the food basket). The food situation of the Malian refugees (about 90 000 people, mainly children) also keeps deteriorating despite assistance from WFP and from the government.

The poor nutritional situation is also concerning: 11.1% of MAG with peaks at 27% and 1.9% of SAM with peaks at 5.7%.

The first agricultural campaign monitoring results (that remain to be confirmed at the end of the season) show excess rainfall over almost all regions with a good pastoral and agricultural season. An increase in cereal production of 6% and 30% is expected on average compared to 2021 and the average of the last 5 years. Areas at risk (pocket of drought and chronic poverty) have been pre-identified and should be subject to close monitoring during the next CH/IPC analysis especially for the 8 departments, comprising nearly 1 million people, with many indicators in the red (Malnutrition, high % of food insecurity and negative strategies)

### Drivers

The persistence of a high level of poverty and extreme poverty in rural areas is the key driver.

The limited access to food is aggravated by several factors, poor agro-pastoral results in 2021, high dependency on food imports, high food and input prices, and extreme weather events such as droughts and floods.

Mauritania has a 70% dependency on food imports (nearly 10% of its GDP) with 50% of its imported wheat coming from Russia and Ukraine.

Mauritania is currently exposed to a high risk of debt distress and therefore has limited fiscal space to manage this situation effectively.



## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 10.1 million in 2022: Food assistance (40%), health and nutrition (24%), disaster preparedness (18%), education (15%), logistic support (3%). DG ECHO provides food assistance mainly through cash (100% of food ration through cash and local enriched flour in kind). This includes a EUR 1.5 million allocation from EDF to address emergency food needs (contracting ongoing).
- EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- EU Delegation rural development program (Rimrap, Rimdir, Rimfil: EUR 46 million) in the closing phase – Top up of EUR 12 million considered with EDF leftover funds.
- USAID/BHA: USD 9 million, including USD 5 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June-July.
- World Bank: National social safety nets extension including Malian refugees of Mberra.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Sustain coverage of the food needs and ensure better mechanisms to avoid exclusion of the most vulnerable, including refugees.
- Increase long-term financial support and investment to improve food security sustainably.
- Increase in the State budget for the agro-pastoral sector in accordance with the Maputo commitments<sup>5</sup>, while guaranteeing better effectiveness and efficiency of public expenditure.
- Continue to ensure a leading role in coordination and advocacy for an increased interest in Mauritania ("forgotten" Sahelian country in West Africa).

## *Niger*

### *Situation and evolution*

The 2022 March IPC analysis (based on data produced before the Russian aggression against Ukraine) shows an increase of 91% of food insecure people in IPC/CH3+ expected in the lean season 2022, compared to those of 2021. This represents an increase of 166% compared to the last 5-year average. In total, 4.4 million people are food insecure during the 2022 lean season. The greatest increase is represented by the number of people in IPC phase 4, which is 95% more than in 2021 (425 805 people) – or 411% if calculated on the last three years. This is the highest caseload since the IPC analyses of 2015. From January 2022 to June 2022, 190 913 children under five suffering from severe acute malnutrition were admitted for treatment (i.e., 39% of the annual target of 491 822 SAM). An increase in the number of admissions of severe malnourished children was observed in August 2022, as well as an 11% increase in the number IDP's compared to August 2021.

<sup>5</sup> Programme détaillé pour le développement de l'agriculture africaine (PDDAA), launched in 2003 in Maputo by Heads of State and Government under the auspices of the African Union and the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD)

There has been a significant pre-lean state response in 2022 and significant progress in the mobilisation of actors and the government for the 2022 emergency food response: at the end of July 2022, planned food assistance should cover 97% of the caseload (1.5 million people by the government, 2.2 million by WFP, 0.3 million by NGO's and 86 000 by ICRC). However, the first government food distribution (only cereals and salt) was late and the second one is being finalised in mid-October. 1.4 million people should benefit from subsidised cereal prices in a non-targeted way. WFP announced a USD 23.5 million net funding requirement for the period from August 2022 to January 2023.

In mid-October, there is a downward trend in food products of around 2 to 3% compared to August despite the beginning of harvest period. Prices remain higher than those of 2021 (+1% for rice to +4% for millet) and even more compared to the average of the last 5 years (+8% for rice to +20% for millet). These price anomalies are down compared to the lean season. There is a very high variability of price levels between regions for the same commodity, from simple to double.

The security situation in September remains volatile despite a slight decrease in the number of incidents compared to the previous period.

The first agricultural campaign monitoring results (which remain to be confirmed at the end of the season) have identified 1 926 agricultural villages at risk of crop failure. A cereal production increase (+37%) is expected compared to 2022 but still below (-19%) the last 5-year average. Pockets of agricultural and pastoral deficit (particularly in the conflict areas of Tillabéry, Tahoua and Diffa) have been pre-identified and should be subject to close monitoring. These trends remain to be confirmed at the end of the season and should be put into perspective in conflict zones given the difficulties of access to fields, the low yields in these zones and the dependence of IDPs on assistance.

### *Drivers*

The main direct and indirect drivers are the consequences of the intensification of conflict in neighbouring countries Mali, Burkina Faso, and Nigeria. In particular, there is a substantial deterioration of security and humanitarian access in the Tillabery area, and security concerns in Tahoua, NW Nigeria and Maradi. The crisis is aggravated by a historic deficit of agro-pastoral production which occurred in 2021 (-36% compared to the 2020 campaign and the average of the last five years) at the national and sub-regional level as well as by the rise of national, sub-regional and international food prices (cf. FAO Index) since 2021. The increase of price of diesel fuel (+24%, at the beginning of August) and its shortages are additional negative factors.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- Close to EUR 50 million have been released to support a multi-sectoral humanitarian response notably by rapid response mechanisms. Food assistance (45%), rapid multi-sectoral response to IDP's (21%) and health (8%) are the most important sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash (increasing) and in-kind deliveries. This includes EUR 6 million from EDF and EUR 2 million from SEAR, being contracted.
- EU is a leading actor in diplomacy and humanitarian advocacy coordination. On 6 April 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted (with GNAFC, OECD, Club du Sahel) a Panel during the Food Crisis Prevention Network (RPCA) bi-annual meeting, where the food insecurity crisis, related drivers and insufficient funding of the response were highlighted. EUR 2.5 billion (including funds already planned and development funding) have been mobilised for the sub-region targeting households in food crisis.

## Other actors' main interventions

- EU delegation : FPI, Programme de Développement d'Urgence (résilience) in rural areas.
- USAID/BHA: USD 25 million top up for food assistance in 2022 June-July.
- Ongoing reallocation of resources from the World Bank and USD 5.3 million from the African Development Bank.
- GBP 33 million for 35 months from the FCDO/UK Sahel Regional Fund (starting in 2023).

## Needs and opportunities

- Need for more efficient and scaled-up response to essential basic needs and prioritisation of assistance to vulnerable households.
- Additional short and long-term financial support is required as well as more efficient emergency and post-emergency assistance of food assistance, of livelihood, of productive sectors and infrastructure in rural areas.
- Increase the funding efforts and advocacy of the EU and other partners.
- Accelerate the concrete operationalisation of the Nexus and its monitoring and evaluation, for IDPs.

## Nigeria

### Situation and evolution

Nigeria is part of the 5 countries at the highest alert level, as there are populations facing starvation (Catastrophe, IPC Phase 5) or at risk of deterioration towards catastrophic conditions as they have already critical food insecurity (Emergency, IPC Phase 4) and are facing severe aggravating factors. 19.5 million people were projected in CH Phase 3 to 5 during the 2022 lean season, up by 52% from 2021. Severe food needs remain very high in the overall country, especially in the Northeast (Borno, Adamawa and Yobe States - BAY) and in the North-West, where acute food needs have significantly increased over the years along with acute malnutrition. According to the available information, almost 40% of households in Borno, Adamawa and Yobe have inadequate food consumption during the current lean season. Only 33% of cultivating households have some food stocks remaining and only 16% have stocks that will last longer than a month. The Humanitarian Situation Monitoring of September 2022 in BAY States shows concerning food consumption deficits and limited diversity of diets in the inaccessible areas surveyed. Almost half of the households struggle to have sufficient food intake and nearly 60% experienced a crisis or higher levels (IPC Phase 3+) of food deprivation and hunger. 40% of the households relied on crisis coping strategies to meet their food needs. The levels of acute malnutrition among new arrivals from the inaccessible areas are serious (Phase 4 IPC Acute Malnutrition Classification) with the overall Global Acute Malnutrition (GAM) rate at 20.9% and Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) at 8.2%. Overall, both crude and under five mortality rates (CMR and U5MR) are above the emergency thresholds. In Borno State, from January to August 2022, 140 000 children were suffering from severe acute malnutrition (SAM) and admitted to nutrition treatment centres. It is equal to almost 97% of annual targeted children in 2022. As the malnutrition crisis in northwest Nigeria continues at catastrophic levels, calls are being made on the humanitarian community to respond to these emergency needs and for northwest Nigeria to be included in the next HRP (2023), enabling a broader and more sustained response.

The ongoing local policy to close all IDP camps continues and reduces access to those in need. Through the second wave of camps closure, about 139 000 IDPs were relocated from several IDP camps in Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (M.M.C.), Jere and Konduga Local Government Areas (LGAs) to other locations in Borno State. The Borno State Government-led camp closures and relocation, resettlement, and return has elicited significant concerns regarding IDPs' safety and dignity, and around the guiding principles of voluntariness and informed consent. Dire living conditions and limited access to basic services and assistance have also triggered secondary, or multiple, population movements into congested IDP camps. The uncoordinated resettlement and relocation of IDPs to inaccessible or hard-to-reach areas risks increasing food insecurity and malnutrition.

### *Drivers*

Insecurity linked to ongoing conflict between non-State armed groups (NSAG) and government security forces (Northeast), banditry (Northwest) and intercommunal clashes remain the key drivers of food insecurity. Farmers struggle to access their lands and cultivate their fields, while herders cannot move their livestock freely. Many local government areas remain completely or partially inaccessible for humanitarian assistance and it is estimated that in 2022 that 1 million people nationally are in areas inaccessible to international humanitarian actors.

Climate change also reduces the resilience of community and fuels intercommunity violence on the use of natural resources. The elevated levels of consumption gaps, malnutrition, mortality, and unsustainable use of emergency coping strategies (people spend their savings, borrow money and sell their assets/goods. Emergency coping strategies are begging or selling land or a house. Crisis strategies is translated in withdrawing children from school and selling productive assets or means of transport), are largely driven by the limited availability of food stocks, restricted access to functional markets and poor water, health and sanitation services, which might heighten morbidity risk, and impact more negatively on households' ability to engage in labour for food or resource gathering.

The recent rainfalls witnessed in Nigeria, coupled with the opening of a dam in Cameroon, resulted in the devastation of shelters and camp facilities in six camps hosting 15 618 individuals. Nearly 2.7 million of vulnerable population live in the flooded areas and it is estimated 743 000 ha of cropland have been flooded.

The war against Ukraine has worsened the situation with skyrocketing prices affecting basic food commodities and agricultural inputs, affecting the production capacities of farmers. Moreover, the Naira has depreciated on the parallel market by 33% (year-on— year). The ongoing devaluation of the Naira will continue to exert pressure on food prices throughout Nigeria. Consumers' purchasing power is still lowered, with a substantial increase in cereal prices compared to the same time last August. Particularly, local rice had a 24 % year-on-year increase in Maiduguri and 25 % in Damaturu.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- ECHO is providing a total of EUR 58.5 million to respond to the urgent needs of conflict affected population in Nigeria. This includes an indicative amount of EUR 9 million from the European Development Fund to address the food crisis following Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine.

- Sectors: Food assistance (23%), health and nutrition (16%), protection (16%) and WASH/Shelter (16%) are priority sectors. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash, vouchers, and in-kind deliveries.
- Advocacy: EU/ECHO is a leading voice in humanitarian advocacy in the Northeast.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- BHA, and to some extent FCDO, focusing on emergency food assistance programming.
- BHA has recently validated a significant top-up of USD 38 million to WFP to address the consequences of the food crisis, bringing their total budget to WFP to USD 338 million.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve prioritisation of assistance and vulnerability assessment, ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups, including through the de-committed EDF funds for food emergency assistance.
- Assist forcibly displaced people from the Maiduguri Metropolitan Council (MMC) and Jere camp closure.
- Leverage funding to assist all vulnerable IDPs in the garrison towns' camps who do not have access to long-term sustainable livelihood opportunities.
- Where feasible, immediately support agriculture in this the crop season to ensure better agricultural production.

## **2.2. East and Southern Africa**

### **Ethiopia**

#### *Situation and evolution*

The severity of food insecurity in Ethiopia is among the worst globally due to the impacts of ongoing conflict, violence, and climatic shocks such as the prolonged drought. Humanitarian needs continue to grow with more than 20 million people in need of humanitarian assistance - including nearly 5.5 million internally displaced people and 18 million non-displaced affected people - according to the latest Humanitarian Response Plan.

Emergency (IPC Phase 4) and Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes will likely be widespread in multiple areas of the country. Tigray is expected to remain the area of highest concern until the start of the harvest in October 2022. The latest WFP Food Security Assessment in Tigray in June 2022 found 89% of households as food insecure and 47% as severely food insecure (of a population of 6 million). The situation could rapidly worsen since, as of the time of writing (29 August), renewed fighting took place between the warring parties. This could possibly signify a return to large-scale military conflict.

The revised updated Horn of Africa Drought Regional Overview (24 August 2022) indicated that nearly 10 million people are in need of food assistance, and 2.9 million children and pregnant and lactating women require nutrition interventions until the end of the year in the drought affected areas. To date, more than 3.5 million livestock have died, while at least 25 million are at risk and are very weak and emaciated with no or little milk production, the main source of nutrition for children. Most recent forecasts project that the October to

December season will also be below average, setting the stage for an unprecedented fifth failed rainy season.

Increase in malnutrition is reported from across the country. People in need of nutrition support are estimated to be 7.5 million (Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) and Moderate Acute Malnutrition (MAM), U5 and Pregnant Lactating Women (PLW)). There is a widespread shortage of F-75 in the country and irregular availability of SC+ and MAM commodities affecting the nutritional treatment.

Scaled-up access to basic services and sustained food assistance, as well as unfettered humanitarian access, is needed immediately to save lives.

### *Drivers*

Conflict in the northern part of the country that affects three regional states directly (Tigray, Afar and Amhara). In addition, several other parts of the country are impacted by localised conflicts that further worsen the food and nutrition security of the affected populations.

Drought in the East, South, and South-Eastern part of the country, currently affecting Afar, Somali Regional State, Southern Oromia and Southern SNNPR.

The crisis in Ukraine and macro-economic situation have affected the food import and market prices. In June 2022, inflation across the country reached the highest rate in Eastern Africa (34 %). Only during the first half of 2022 food prices increased by 26% and the cost of the food basket by 33% (65.2% in one year). Despite price control measures, petrol prices showed a marked increase compared with pre-war levels (up 16%). Between June 2022 and June 2021, Ethiopia recorded one of the highest year-on-year depreciations of local currency, down by 194 %, against the USD.

Limited access, due to insecurity as well as major bureaucratic impediments, is limiting the capacity of humanitarian agencies to deliver, particularly in Tigray.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 58 million allocated in 2022 (plus EUR 8 million under the upcoming EDF de-committed funds).
- Food assistance (12%), WASH (7%), Health (13%), Nutrition (19%), S/NFIs (5%), protection (7%), DRR/DP (15%), Coordination (4%), logistic (7%) education (6%) and cash (6%).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The Ethiopian Humanitarian Country Team (EHCT) produced a dedicated drought response plan (USD 1.66 billion) to which contributions have been made, mainly by the US (over USD 400 million). Currently the plan is largely under-funded.
- The Ethiopia Safety net program has a crisis/shock response capacity besides its routine response covering over 8 million people.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Scaling up of the response is urgently required.
- Need to produce more comprehensive specific and tangible data and specific analyses to support targeted responses.
- Need to enhance support from development actors to build further resilience of affected communities.



## Kenya

### *Situation and evolution*

According to the findings of the long rain assessment (MAM season), 3.5 million people are food insecure in the Arid and Semi-Arid Land regions (ASAL), with Marsabit, Wajir, and Mandera counties facing IPC Phase 4 food security outcomes between March and June 2022. Significant deteriorations were also reported in Mandera and Wajir, moving them from IPC Phase 3 to Phase 4.

On 16 September, the UNHCR and DRS have resumed the profiling exercise in Dadaab refugee complex: in three days only, over 9 500 individuals have been counted, however the exercise had to be put on hold for security reasons. Given the number of arrivals, the authorities are exploring the possibility to re-open Ifo II camp, which was previously handed over to the local establishment in 2019.

Similarly, in Kakuma and Kalobeyei refugee camps, from the beginning of 2022, 17 266 new arrivals and 4 256 new births have been reported. The Reception Centres are once again overcrowded and over their capacities.

The drought-induced decline in crop production and the related reduced availability of cereals on markets has increased food prices. The fallout of Ukraine's war adds onto this, as increased production costs (fuel and inputs) are also contributing to the price spikes. Due to reduced availability, food inflation is exceeding annual inflation in Kenya, with food price increases almost double the annual inflation (13.8 vs. 7.9 %). Over the last year the price of the local food basket has increased particularly for maize, flour, and wheat/grains (up to 123%), thus leading to a significant increase of the Minimum Expenditure Basket (up to 35% in Turkana County only).

Up to 70 % of the cropland in the ASALs was affected by the severe drought. Cereal production prospects are therefore unfavourable, likely leading to a fourth consecutive poor harvest.

Estimates indicate that at least 2.4 million livestock have died in Kenya. Water availability for livestock is also at below-normal levels and is expected to deteriorate quicker than usual during the June to September dry season. For all livestock species combined across the six assessed Kenyan counties (Garissa, Kitui, Kwale, Laikipia, Marsabit and West Pokot), the Body Condition Score (BCS) in June 2022 was found to be poor.

### *Drivers*

Limited access to food is compounded by several factors:

- Climatic shocks: four consecutive poor rainy seasons have led to severe droughts.
- Cost and availability of fuel: high fuel prices are pushing up the inflation rate, including food inflation rates, leading to a significant increase in the overall cost of living.
- August political elections: the political campaigns have diverted the needed attention from the current drought and new arrivals' registration in the Dadaab refugee camp.
- Localised population movements linked to resource-based tensions: local conflicts over resources (among the ASAL pastoral communities) as well as increased cross-border displacement induced by the drought (with reports of over 25 000 individuals newly arrived in Dadaab refugee camp alone).
- The worsening economic crisis: the effects of low incomes, the depreciation of the Kenyan shilling against the US dollar.



- The Russian invasion of Ukraine is contributing to the increase of food prices on local market, particularly for wheat, further highlighting the dependency on imported goods such as fertilisers, fuel, and wheat.

### Ongoing interventions

The Kenya Drought Appeal launched by OCHA has been revised: USD 157.2 million have been funded (or 61% of the appeal), however, USD 250.5 million are still needed.

### ECHO interventions



- Total funding HIP 2022: EUR 16.4 million.
- Ratio/percentage of allocation for priority sectors: Food assistance (WFP EUR 4 million + Kenya Cash Consortium EUR 1.5 million for MPCA), health and nutrition (IRC EUR 2.4 million + UNICEF EUR 1 million).

### Other actors' main interventions

- Funding from other main stakeholders such as USAID, FCDO, DE, etc: Germany USD 2 170 154 (committed); Sweden USD 1 027 855 (committed); Norway USD 1 761 841 (paid). In August, the U.S. government committed USD 310.9 million in emergency assistance to tackle the consequences of the severe drought.

### Needs and opportunities

- Funding gap: additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance for the most vulnerable groups.
- Explore nexus possibilities with the EDF de-committed funds (ECHO EUR 2.55 million for humanitarian food assistance in Kenya and Djibouti, and INTPA EUR 10 million for food production).
- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement in Kenya.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

## Madagascar

### *Situation and evolution*

Around 1.68 million people out of the 5.25 million people of the Grand Sud and Grand Sud-Est regions of Madagascar analysed are experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3+) between April and August 2022. In the Grand Sud, although the situation remains fragile, it has improved compared to April 2021. However, 33% of the population in the Grand Sud is still highly food insecure (IPC Phase 3+), including 122 000 people in IPC Phase 4.

In the coming months, both for the first projection period (September to November 2022) and for the second projection (December 2022 to March 2023), a deterioration in the food security situation is expected. While seasonal price drops have been observed for most staple foods in recent months, prices remain higher than both last year and the 5-year average, demonstrating the rising cost of living for households. Rising gasoline prices are expected to contribute to continued increases in food prices, especially in the Grand Sud, where markets are dependent on imported and locally produced staples being transported long distances from surplus producing areas in other regions.

### *Drivers*

The food insecurity currently experienced in Madagascar is driven by several factors and notably: (i) Southern Madagascar continues to experience its worst drought in 40 years, leaving part of the population fighting for survival. More than 3 years of consecutive severe drought have wiped out harvests and hampered access to food in the Grand Sud; (ii) Between Mid-January and April 2022, six tropical cyclones and storms hit Madagascar. The 2021/2022 cyclonic season affected more than 960 000 people in the North and Southern part of the country. Floods affected about 60 000 hectares of rice fields, which resulted in a below-average harvest in May, undermining both farmers' livelihoods and food supply in country; (iii) the government's action in raising gasoline prices in July by 43%, while the price of diesel increased by 44%. Price shocks within the COVID-19 context and the Russian invasion of Ukraine combined with crop losses due to climatic phenomena have the potential to transform the creeping inflation rate into galloping inflation; and (iv) insecurity related to bandits in the Grand Sud restricts people's movement and affects livelihoods, amplifying food insecurity.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- In 2022, EU humanitarian assistance amounted to EUR 12.4 million to respond to the food insecurity and nutrition emergency needs. This includes EUR 1.9 million to respond to the 2021/2022 cyclonic season and EUR 4 million newly allocated to the humanitarian response to support the scale-up of food assistance delivery. In addition, EUR 1 million is being allocated to reinforce Early Warning Systems to drought in Grand Sud along a nexus approach with EU delegation.
- Priority sectors: Food Assistance (WFP EUR 6 million) (48%), Nutrition (UNICEF EUR 2 million, ACF EUR 1.5 million) (28 %) and MPCT (WFP EUR 1 million) (8%).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The flash appeal launched on 18 January 2021 has been further extended until December 2022 with additional funding requirement of USD 158.6 million for the period May - December 2022, including USD 114.8 million for the Food Security sector. USA, Central Emergency Response Fund (CERF) and SIDA represent the main contributors in 2022.

- Total funding towards food insecurity in 2022: USD 67 177 021 including ECHO (some of the funding received in 2022 are not part of the latest flash appeal extension until December 2022).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- 10th/11th EDF de-committed funds allocation to DG ECHO provisionally earmarked EUR 4 million for food assistance in 2022 to vulnerable populations in the Grand Sud and South-East of Madagascar.
- 10th/11th EDF de-committed funds allocation to DG INTPA provisionally earmarked EUR 10 million for boosting agricultural production in Madagascar (expected duration: 7.5 years).
- The EU development cooperation programming for the next period includes structuring long-term activity in the Grand Sud. The EU's Development Programming in Madagascar (country-wide) amounts to EUR 325 million for the 2021-2024 period. The three priority areas are: Governance and human development, Sustainable growth and jobs, and Green Deal.

## **Mozambique**

### *Situation and evolution*

Between April and September 2022, 1.4 million people (10% of the population) are projected to face Crisis or worse conditions (IPC Phase 3+), including approximately 24 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4). 1.1 million people in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3+), including 23 500 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4), are in the northern provinces of Cabo Delgado, Nampula, Niassa and Zambezia. This is an 18% year-on-year increase. The rise in global food and non-food costs is resulting in higher living costs in Mozambique. In June, the year-on-year inflation rate increased to 10.81%, the highest value in over 4 years. Typically, food prices decreased between May and July, driven by increased market supply following the annual harvest, but high transportation costs and increased demand for non- wheat products (maize, cassava, sweet potato) are keeping food prices high. In June, fuel prices increased an additional 4-19%, following previous price increases in March and May. With the deepening of the Ukraine crisis, there are concerns about the impact on local prices and availability as the region is a net importer of wheat and edible oil, energy, and fertilisers.

### *Drivers*

The main drivers of food insecurity in the current period include: (i) the armed conflict in Cabo Delgado province which, according to IOM Displacement Tracking Matrix (DTM) of 30 June 2022, has displaced 946 508 people; (ii) shortage of rainfall or irregular rains in parts of Nampula, Tete, Manica, Gaza, Inhambane and Maputo provinces; (iii) increasing food prices; (iv) impact of COVID-19 restrictive measures. Moreover, at the beginning of 2022, the northern provinces were hit by two severe extreme weather events which left more than 700 000 people in need of food and shelter. The southern regions on the other hand, were adversely affected by a lack of rainfall during the same period, which resulted in moderately drier than average conditions. Throughout February and until mid-March severe drought conditions developed in the south of the country.

Mozambique depends on import for 90% of its wheat and sunflower seed oil needs; the country imports more than a third (39%) of its wheat from Russia (31%) and Ukraine (8%) combined. Mozambique currently imports almost 20% of fertilisers from Russia. Elevated global fertiliser prices are concerning as reduced availability/accessibility will result in lower food production in Mozambique, which in turn would result in higher food import needs at a time when global food prices are rising steeply.

*Ongoing interventions***ECHO interventions**

- EUR 20 million allocated to Mozambique in 2022 (HIP22HIP 2022: EUR 14 million; SEAR: EUR 5 million; Alert: EUR 1 million).
- Food Assistance (20%), Nutrition (5%) and Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (6.7%). DG ECHO provides aid mainly through in-kind and cash deliveries.
- EU NutriNorte (AAP 22) allocates EUR 30 million on Nutrition for a duration of 5 years (2022-2027) targeting the provinces of Zambezia, Nampula and Cabo Delgado.

**Other actors' main interventions**

- On 20 July 2022, USAID pledged USD 116 million in additional assistance to respond to needs, including severe food insecurity, in Mozambique. This funding brings US humanitarian assistance to Mozambique to USD 167 million in Fiscal Year 2022.
- OCHA HRP 2022 in Northern Mozambique (Cabo Delgado, Nampula and Niassa):
  - a total of 1.01 million - 104% of 970 000 people targeted - have been reached with humanitarian food and livelihoods assistance. This represents 92% of total people in need (1.1 million).
  - a total of 84 000– 41% of 203 000 people targeted – have been reached with nutrition intervention. This is 26% of total people in need (327 000).

*Needs and opportunities*

- 10th/11th EDF de-committed funds allocation to DG-ECHO. Provisionally, EUR 8 million earmarked for Food Assistance in 2022 to vulnerable populations in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique.
- 10th/11th EDF de-committed funds INTPA allocation provisionally earmarked EUR 15 million for expansion of ongoing agricultural programme in Nampula to Zambezia, Tete, Manica, Sofala and Gaza. Duration: 7.5 years.

**Somalia***Situation and evolution*

The latest IPC analysis indicates that extreme and prolonged drought has resulted in approximately 6.7 million people expected to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) or worse between October and December 2022, with an official declaration of famine projected during that period in the Baidoa and Burhakaba districts (Bay Region), and an additional 17 districts at risk of famine. Follow-up assessments of the food security situation in the most exposed districts were conducted in October 2022. Even if the results have not been published at the time of drafting this report, it seems unlikely that a famine is declared for the moment. However, the risk of famine remains high.

Humanitarian needs are extremely high due to the impacts of four consecutive seasons of poor rainfall, an anticipated fifth season of below average rainfall from October to December, and exceptionally high food prices, exacerbated by concurrent conflict/insecurity and disease outbreaks (diarrhoea/cholera and measles).

The nutrition situation has deteriorated across most of the country. Acute malnutrition case admissions among children under age five have continued to rise sharply. Based on recent analyses, the total estimated acute malnutrition burden for Somalia from August 2022 to July 2023 is approximately 1.8 million children. This represents 54.5% of the total population of children in Somalia and includes 513 550 children who are likely to be severely malnourished. A rapid mass nutritional screening of under-5 children in Baidoa district is showing a serious deterioration in their nutritional status, with severe acute malnutrition rate reaching 24% (vs 10.2% in June-July) and global acute malnutrition rate at 59% (vs 28.6% in June-July). Other mass screenings realised in Bosaso and Adado rural villages are showing similarly worrying results.

The number of people displaced by drought in Somalia since January 2021 has increased by 68 400 in August 2022, reaching close to 1.2 million in total. The recent increase of conflict between Al Shabab and several clans backed by the Somali National Army is also forcing people of the involved areas to displace, compounding the negative effects on the populations. All those factors are provoking an influx of refugees into Dadaab camp area in Kenya.

### *Drivers*

Most global weather forecasts indicate a widespread below-average rainfall in October-December 2022, marking a potential fifth poor rainfall season. This is materialising in some districts, especially in the South of the country. Drought conditions are expected to persist through the end of the year and will most likely worsen during the typically dry January to March 2023 season, with further adverse impact on livelihoods, food security, nutrition, and mortality.

This lasting drought spell is currently compounded by an increase of the conflict between Al Shabab and several clans backed by the Somali National Army, in Hiran, Middle Shabelle and Galgadug regions, with a potential for extension in neighbouring regions that may drive further displacements. People fleeing the conflict are displacing towards areas where the drought already has a strong impact (Baidoa, Banadir regions), and this influx brings increasing pressure on a severe humanitarian situation.

### *Ongoing interventions*



ECHO has allocated close to EUR 100 million since December 2021 to the drought response, with EUR 79.5 million allocated in 2022 and launched a Humanitarian Air Bridge to deliver emergency supplies to hard-to-reach areas. An estimated 50 to 70 flights will transport 650 metric tonnes of life-saving nutrition and health commodities to underserved and hard-to-reach locations.

In August, the UN Emergency Relief Coordinator announced a system-wide scale-up of the response. In October, the Humanitarian Response Plan funding requirement was revised to USD 2.26 billion, an increase of 54% from the original requirement of USD 1.46 billion, to consider the severity of the humanitarian situation. The overall population targeted by humanitarian assistance has been revised to 7.6 million people from 5.5 million originally. The current funding by donors represents 46% of the total, with the main donors being USAID (USD 898 million), EU (USD 77.9 million) and EU member states (more than USD 65 million). A first-line Integrated Response Framework, which aims at responding in a holistic way to newly displaced people and critically underserved people living in areas most hit by the drought, has been developed by the Humanitarian Country Team, in order to improve the efficiency of the Response. This response is also striving at a better inclusion of chronically underserved minority clans in their access to humanitarian aid.



## Needs and opportunities

- The recent increase in the HRP requirement underlines the funding gap for the response, despite several important announcements by main donors.
- Improved prioritisation of assistance, fully implementing the use of the First Line Integrated Response Framework, in order to ensure a better coverage of populations in need.
- Support the system-wide scale-up to operationalise plans and deliver at scale, in particular by engaging into registration systems inter-operability discussions between major responders (WFP and IOM).
- Advocate with other services and donors for increased engagement on Somalia through additional funding or reorientation of existing ones.



Source: IPC Post-Gu assessment, 12th September 2022

## South Sudan

### Situation and evolution

The scale and severity of acute food insecurity are extremely high during the ongoing peak of the lean season, with Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes in over 50 counties of South Sudan resulting from a combination of the impacts of conflict and flooding, as well as global supply chain disruptions that have driven high staple food prices and limited income-earning opportunities.

About 7.74 million (63%) South Sudanese are acutely food-insecure (IPC 3 and above). Of these, 87 000 are experiencing catastrophic food insecurity conditions (IPC 5) in Jonglei, Lakes and Unity. About 1.34 million children under five years old are malnourished, representing an increase of 18% compared to 2021 (Nutrition SMART Surveys).

Overall, the scale of humanitarian assistance delivery during the peak of the lean season has been lower than the distribution plans made available in June. Hence, a higher number of counties are likely to face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes than originally anticipated. Specifically, Emergency (IPC Phase 4) outcomes are now expected in Cueibet of Lakes; Gogrial East of Warrap; Guit and Koch of Unity; and Nassir and Maiwut of Upper Nile. In several of these counties, assistance deliveries are still ongoing, but levels are notably lower than the total population in need. Fangak, Canal/Pigi, and Ayod of Jonglei; Leer and Mayendit of Unity; and Tonj East and Tonj North of Warrap remain of highest concern, where some populations are likely in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5). Households in Catastrophe (IPC Phase 5) are those who have been severely impacted by repeated conflict and ongoing flooding that has significantly disrupted their livelihoods and access to food.

Protracted and localised conflict and insecurity significantly disrupted farming, livestock, and trade activities in multiple areas across the country. This has eroded household capacity to access food and income. In addition, persistent flooding, combined with pockets of drought, is likely to reduce production in the subsistence farming during the upcoming harvest season. The overall cereal production deficit in 2022 is estimated at around 541 000 tonnes, representing 40% of South Sudan's cereal needs, an increase by 16% of the 2021 deficit and the five-year average (2017–2021). Persistent macroeconomic shocks leading to hyperinflation have led to market price volatility. Impacts of both COVID-19 and Russian invasion of Ukraine make the situation worse. Between mid-2021 and mid-2022, the fuel prices in the country increased by 43% (UNHAS).

The forecast for above-average rainfall and a fourth consecutive year of flooding from August to November will likely depress the frequency and severity of inter-communal conflict in Jonglei and GPAA until the receding of floodwaters.

Conflict is likely to rise again from November and peak in December, though levels are unlikely to be as high as in late 2021, given the additional security force deployments to the area.

Seasonal increases in conflict are likely at the end of 2022 due to worsening socioeconomic pressures, including the devaluation of the South Sudanese pound, coupled with high prices for food and essential non-food goods.

### *Drivers*

- Recurring flooding and subnational violence, including intercommunal conflicts, cattle raiding, and proxy-war instigated by Juba-based political leaders trigger population displacement, livelihoods' destruction, trading reduction, currency volatility and roads and supply chains' cuts.
- While rainfall during the main rainy season has been below average in most areas, atypical flooding is still expected, based on forecasts for above-average rainfall through October amid already high river levels and highly saturated soils. A fourth consecutive year of flooding is expected to result in another year of livestock and crop losses.
- The country is heavily reliant on food and non-food commodity imports from Ethiopia, Kenya and Uganda. Any increase in production and transport costs from these countries and elsewhere will be passed on to the South Sudanese consumer, whose purchasing power is already compromised.
- Regional tensions (Ethiopia and Sudan) have led to (temporary) closures of supply roads and/or borders, reducing the trading and impoverishing market supplies and WFP's supplies too. The dependency on international supplies also makes the country more sensitive to macro-economic shocks for food commodities, fertilisers and other agricultural inputs.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- As of August 2022, the ECHO HIP is worth EUR 73.7 million. The funding is divided between food and nutrition (32%), health (17%), protection (9%), WASH (8%), Cash/Multi-Purpose Cash Transfers (5%), Camp Coordination and Camp Management (5%), Education in Emergencies (4%) and coordination/logistics (18%). Programmatic Partnerships: UNICEF is contracted for nutrition (EUR 5 million); IFRC for disaster preparedness (EUR 2 million) including MPCT; and Concern for nutrition and health (EUR 2 million).
- Under the HIP modification, an indicative amount of EUR 6 million will be available to support the following priorities: (1) an immediate scale-up of life-saving emergency/rapid multisectoral assistance in areas with IPC 3 and above, including health, protection, WASH, and nutrition, supporting the food security outcomes; (2) WASH and shelter non-food items (SNFI) pipeline in the country.
- ECHO finances emergency food assistance in IPC 4 and 5 areas. Agricultural production and road feeders' rehabilitation are also funded in a nexus approach.

### **Other actor's main interventions**

- Key donors (USAID, FCDO) dedicate large part of their funding to food assistance and nutrition, being the most critical lifesaving sectors in the country with health.

## *Needs and opportunities*


- The South Sudan crisis is underfunded, with deteriorating food security and nutrition situation. The 2022 HRP is 32% funded only as of August 2022.
- Late and low funding (-20% compared to 2021), led to cutting 1.7 million beneficiaries from General Food Distribution (GFD). IPC 2, 3 and partly 4 areas were not covered since May 2022. However, WFP is changing its plan to cover again a total of 6.1 million people in country.
- The Food, Security and Livelihoods (FSL) cluster is also only 32% funded (USD 441 million gap out of USD 650 million required).
- Pursue coordination efforts with WFP and FSL actors to increase cash modality wherever feasible and reinforce coordination with development donors to scale-up long-term investments on agriculture, basic services, and infrastructures.
- Monitor malnutrition closely.
- Activate collective diplomatic advocacy towards the Government of South Sudan to enforce law and reduce violence.

## *Uganda*

### *Situation and evolution*


According to the IPC data released at the end of May 2022 for Karamoja, 518 000 people are in urgent need of food assistance: 428 000 individuals in IPC 3 and almost 90 000 in IPC 4. In addition, 91 600 children under five and 9 500 pregnant women will be acutely malnourished and in need of treatment for the remainder of the year and into January 2023. In refugee settlements, out of the 1.5 million refugees and asylum seekers, 1.4 million rely on continuous food assistance. The poor production season this year and recurrent natural

disasters have resulted in casualties and damage and loss of human and animal lives, property damage, destruction of crops and infrastructural developments. In September 2022, the average monthly price of the local food basket was 53% higher than in September 2021. Staples maize and beans are particularly affected:



Source: WFP, October 2022

While vegetable oil has shown a slightly stabilising trend in the last quarter:



Source: WFP, October 2022

UNHCR's requirement for 2022 is USD 343.4 million, and as of 21 October 2022 is only 43% funded (USD 148.6 million). The Country Refugee Response Plan Emergency Appeal has been extended from April to December 2022 and increased to USD 68 million from USD 48 million, but is only 15% funded. Due to critical underfunding, WFP has since November 2021 implemented food ration cuts. Groups of refugee settlements receive 70%, 60% or 40% food rations. With no new resources, WFP assistance - for both cash and in-kind - will break by end of 2023.

## Drivers

**Conflict:** regular influx of refugees from South Sudan and DRC (over 110 000 new refugees in 2022). In Karamoja, localised conflict and insecurity.

**Climate shocks and hazards:** poor rainfall performance, frequent flash floods with corresponding waterlogging and occasional devastating landslides.

**Acute Malnutrition:** inadequate food and water access, poor dietary diversity, structural poverty, low value livelihood options, as well as poor hygiene and sanitation. Very poor levels of food consumption among children of 6-23 months, with only 4% of the children consuming a minimum acceptable diet.

**Economic factors:** the economic impacts of COVID-19 restrictions continue to limit household income sources, which has been exacerbated by the war of aggression against Ukraine. Headline inflation rate increased to 10% in September, up from 9.9% in August and 7.9% in July 2022, the highest level since July 2012. The cost of food commodities and education services continues to increase sharply with about 3.5% increase over the past months, while transport and fuel are stabilising, if not declining.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- As of August, the total HIP 2022 for Uganda is EUR 34 million: food assistance 18%; protection 30%; EiE 21%; health 9%; MPCT 12%; coordination 1%; disaster preparedness 10%. In addition, for Disaster Response, 3 DREF operations (total EUR 450 000) has been supported, including for Ebola, as well as the Programmatic Partnership with IFRC for EUR 2.6 million. A further epidemic support package for Ebola response of EUR 3 million is being finalised.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- Design and feasibility for the Kagera Water Supply Pipeline, including branches to refugee settlements in Isingiro Refugee Hosting District, is ongoing. The concept note by the EU delegation to access funding from the Flexible Mechanism to support the response in Southwest is being finalised. In September, the US provided an additional support of USD 82 million: USD 21 million for USAID and USD 61 million for the Bureau of Population, Refugees and Migration (BPRM) with USD 41 million for UNHCR and USD 20 million for other programs.

### *Needs and opportunities*

UNHCR alone needs USD 195 million for their operations for the rest of 2022. An overview for the full Uganda Refugee Response Plan (RRP) is being compiled, but at the end of the second quarter of 2022 the Uganda RRP remained at USD 804 million with only 25% funded. No additional funding is currently available for the last 2 months of 2022.

Recurrent and continuous shortfalls of resources call for extending the donor base, operationalising the needs-based approach through better targeting, and looking for more sustainable and resilient solutions in the context of a protracted refugee crisis.

## **Zimbabwe**

### *Situation and evolution*


According to Rural Zimbabwe Vulnerability Assessment Committee (ZimVAC) 2022 findings, nearly a third of the urban (1.63 million people) and 3.04 million of the rural populations are facing severe food insecurity. Food insecurity of rural households is expected to increase further to 3.82 million people from January to March 2023. Zimbabwe was added to the FAO/WFP list of Hunger Hotspots in June 2022 due to an erratic rainfall season and consequent drop in expected crop production (which declined by 43% nationally and by nearly 50% for communal farmers as compared to last year).



This is compounded by the effects of persistently high inflation (it has jumped from 132% to 191% between May and June), while the local currency (ZWL) has been depreciating against the USD and the gap between the official and informal market rates continues to widen. As per ZimVAC findings, there is a concerning increase in global wasting in 38 high-priority districts. There is also concern over the low rates of exclusive breastfeeding, low dietary diversity, and high rates of micronutrient deficiencies in women, adolescents, and children. As Zimbabwe heads for 2023 presidential elections, access to reliable food security data is challenging. No IPC analysis has been conducted yet in country. A continuation of the Russian aggression against Ukraine could further exacerbate supply disruptions and increases of food, fertilisers and fuel prices.

## Drivers

The Zimbabwe current food crisis is driven by (i) the impact of the below average 2021/22 crop production, with severe food insecurity being projected in South, East, West, and far North areas, where households have already depleted stocks from their own production; (ii) The October-December rains are likely to be mixed with mid-season dry spells and likelihood of cyclones affecting crop production and other livelihoods; (iii) a protracted economic crisis, characterised by high inflation rates that have sharply eroded households' purchasing power; (iv) spiking parallel market foreign currency exchange rates, which is the prime driver of rapidly increasing inflation. Maize meal and bread prices in ZWL increased by approximately 50% and 30%, respectively between March and April 2022.



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

In June, food inflation had seen a month-on-month increase of 31.7% and an increase of 226.2% since June 2021, contributing significantly to overall price increases on the market. Prices are anticipated to come under further upward pressure given the increasing international prices. For example, fuel prices have risen 26 % between March 2021 and 2022. Zimbabwe is 60% and 30% import-dependent on wheat and sunflower oil, respectively. Further price increases of agricultural inputs (fuel and fertilisers) would diminish households' ability to purchase these goods for the next cropping season, starting from September 2022.

Selected basic commodities disappeared mostly in formal markets and there are fears of shortages for some commodities as the macro-economic situation deteriorates. As of July, and earlier than usual, poor households are expected to cope with the situation by reducing consumption and by either intensifying existing livelihood strategies or extending to other measures or activities, such as petty trading, informal mining, and barter. As most poorer households typically earn income in ZWL and have limited access to USD, heavy pricing in USD and high ZWL price volatility is reducing purchasing power and access to food. Due to these liquidity challenges, households in rural areas are slowly resorting to bartering, using grains and livestock to access certain goods or services.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- Current DG ECHO funded interventions in Zimbabwe - excluding regional actions – amount to EUR 2 million for 2022.
- Total allocation supports actions in Disaster Risk Reduction (DRR) /Disaster Preparedness (DP) (IOM EUR 0.5 million and CARE 1.5 million).

### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The African Development Fund has approved a grant of around USD 25.65 million to help enhance domestic food production and supply by distributing certified seeds and fertiliser.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- Decommited 10<sup>th</sup> and 11<sup>th</sup> EDF funds allocation to DG ECHO: EUR 4 million have been earmarked for food assistance (through cash in urban settings) in 2022 for Zimbabwe.
- Support with actions that help secure alternative sources of cereal produce like wheat, to replace 55% disrupted due to the Russian invasion of Ukraine.

## **Sudan**

### *Situation and evolution*

The conflict has reignited in Blue Nile State, Wad-Al-Mahi locality, fighting continues to be reported in the Dam towns, and the situation remains tense. Since mid-July, at least 70 000 people have reportedly been displaced within the state and into neighbouring localities and states due to the inter-tribal conflict, according to the International Organisation for Migration Displacement Tracking Matrix (IOM DTM), bringing the total newly displaced for Sudan in 2022 to approximately 21 000.

Almost a quarter of Sudan's population, a record 11.7 million people, were estimated to be facing acute food insecurity from June to September 2022. With 3.1 million people in IPC 4, Sudan is one of the countries with the highest number of people in this Emergency level of food insecurity.

The cultivation season has been challenged by the high cost of inputs, due to the increase in irrigation costs, as well as the impact of torrential rains and flash floods which damaged approximately 100 000 hectares of cropped land.

In 2022, people in need of nutritional support increased in Severe Acute Malnutrition (SAM) outpatient program (OTP) by 7.7%, SAM stabilisation centres (SC) by 19.7%, and Targeted Supplementary Feeding Program (TSFP) by 3.9%.

Sudan is affected by the high prices of wheat on international markets, coupled with low foreign reserves and the continued devaluation of the national currency. The country's domestic needs for 2022 and first quarter of 2023 is estimated at 2.7 million tonnes. Sudan will have to disburse close to USD 1.5 billion at the rate of USD 550 per ton of wheat to cover its wheat gap.

In September 2022, the consumer price index increased by 10%, and the inflation rate stood at 107%. Staple food prices remained 250-300% above last year and 550-700% above the five-year average. WFP announced serious funding challenges from December 2022 onwards to deliver cash transfers to IDPs and refugees. In addition to that, funding is urgently needed to secure supplies of Ready-to-Use Supplementary Food.

### *Drivers*

- Intercommunal clashes, high prices, and flooding remained the key drivers of acute food insecurity in Sudan.
- September has confirmed to be a typical lean season in Sudan. National food supply contraction coincided with increased staple food and agricultural input prices.
- Increased conflict and insecurity jeopardise access to cultivated land and lead to a more significant proportion of households relying on markets.
- Huge gaps exist between the nutritional needs and the response: below 60% for SAM and below 50% for MAM.
- The 2021-2022 below-average harvest requires Sudan to import 2.5 metric tonnes of wheat from Russia and Ukraine. This will be hindered by the war.
- Lack of hard currency reserves in the banks and continued devaluation of the currency.
- The military coup of 25 October 2021 has led to the suspension of some of the long-term funding (IDA19 of USD 2.3 billion, WB USD 1 billion, US USD 700 million, and the cancellation of the debt relief). The HRP for Sudan is funded at 38% according to the latest Financial Tracking Service (FTS) from OCHA (17/10/2022).

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 46.8 million (HIP 2021 and 2022) allocated for food security and cash assistance projects. An additional Programmatic Partnership with CONCERN for Food Security and Livelihoods (FSL) and nutrition for a total amount of EUR 1.25 million.
- HIP 2022 has an EUR 40 million initial budget: FSL and MPCA & MPCT 20%, health 19%, protection 18%, nutrition 13%, education 10%, WASH 6%, coordination 5%, support to operations 4%, shelter 3%, crisis modifiers 2%.
- The ECHO Rapid Response Mechanism is responding to ongoing emergency needs due to displacement and heavy rains in Darfur, White Nile, River Nile, South Kordofan states (RRM beneficiaries spending over 70% of cash to meet their basic food needs).

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- Draft report presenting the findings from the Sudan case study on the "HDP Nexus: Challenges and Opportunities for its Implementation".
- WFP received EUR 2.5 million from Italy to support emergency nutrition activities (May 2022), as well as GBP 3 million from the UK and USD 4.5 million from Japan for emergency food assistance (August 2022).

- The Sudan Emergency Safety Nets Project funded by World Bank and implemented by WFP is starting to provide 1.8 million vulnerable families with cash assistance and 186 000 people with in-kind assistance each month for four months.
- FAO supported 440 172 households with agriculture and livestock inputs.
- USAID announced more than USD 88 million in additional humanitarian funding for the people of Sudan to provide food assistance (WFP) and support nutritional programming (UNICEF).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- WFP USD 7 million urgently needed to sustain nutrition implementation.
- Government requires USD 340 million for wheat production by November 2022.
- Food security and livelihood (FSL) sector working in Nutrition and FSL integration strategy.
- Started social protection coordination with participation of WFP, UNICEF, World Bank, WHO, ILO and others.

## 2.3. Middle East and North Africa (MENA)

### **Lebanon**

#### *Situation and evolution*

According to the World Food Programme (WFP), nearly 46% of the Lebanese population were acutely food insecure in the second half of 2021, up from 32% in the first half of the year. 67% of the 1.5 million Syrian refugees in Lebanon are food insecure, up from 49% in July 2021. The highest increase in percent of food insecure population was in Beirut (doubling from 31% to 62%), followed by Akkar and Baalbek-Hermel districts.

The first results of an IPC exercise covering the Lebanese population will be published in November 2022. The 2022 Global Report on Food Crises indicated that, in 2021, Lebanon ranked third globally among food-crisis countries hosting the highest numbers of refugees/asylum seekers.

Severe economic, political, and social crisis, compounded by high dependency on imports, currency depreciation, Russia's war against Ukraine, and a global increase in food and fuel prices, are adding to the already dire situation in Lebanon.

The Lebanese Lira continues to depreciate: by September 2022, it is reported to have lost more than 94% of its value against the USD. Concerning trends regarding food imports continue to be reported in 2022: a 14% reduction was registered in the first nine months of 2022 in comparison 2021, 23% and 36% compared to 2020 and 2019 respectively. Food imports were 17% lower in September 2022 compared to the same period in 2021.

### Analysis of food import trends 2019-2022




Source: WFP VAM

Recent vulnerability assessment reports point that 90% of Syrian refugees, 53% of Lebanese households and 73% of Palestinian refugees need assistance to meet their basic needs. Over 90% of Syrian and Lebanese households have adopted at least one food-based coping strategy, the most prominent being reduced portion size of meals. This reflects increasing levels of food insecurity across the board.

To address the summer bread crisis in the country, a USD 150 million loan from the World Bank (WB) to support wheat imports was approved by the Lebanese Parliament. Currency depreciation, inflation and the removal of subsidies from key commodities (including medicines and medical supplies or fuel), have translated into an exponential increase in the cost of food and other basic goods and services (rent, transport, education, health, household utilities). A 10% increase in the cost of the survival minimum expenditure basket (SMEB) was registered between August and September, along with an 8% increase in the consumer price index during that same period.

### Economic Indicator – Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) Jan 2021 to Sept 2022



Source: WFP

The food costs of the Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) in August 2022 are nearly 19 times the cost of the food basket in October 2019, that is an increase of 1757%.



Food assistance provided in the form of cash covers 56.6% of the total cost of the food component of the SMEB: 94% of Syrian refugee households continued to incur debt to survive, mostly to buy food (93%) and pay rent (49%).

The response framework is mainly split between the Lebanon Crisis Response Plan (LCRP), jointly drafted with the Lebanese Government, and the OCHA-led Emergency Response Plan (ERP), targeting Lebanese, Palestinians, and migrants. The food Security sector under the ERP 2022 is 72% funded (approx. USD 48 million out of USD 66.5 million) as per FTS data. LCRP coverage for Food Security in the first quarter of 2022 figures is 14% (USD 138 million out of USD 975 million), while the coverage level for the Basic Assistance sector in the second quarter of 2022 is 18.2% (USD 96.3 million out of USD 530 million). Cash transfers are used to cover food, often at the expense of meeting other types of needs. WFP has a funding requirement for the period August 2022-January 2023 of USD 422 million. WFP received a contribution USD 560 million in 2021, the same amount it received for 2020. For 2023, the funding horizon looks very bleak, the MPCT programme being cut by at least a quarter due to decreasing funds.

### *Drivers*

The impact of the severe financial and economic crisis results in the downgrading of the country from upper middle-income to lower middle-income country. Low foreign currency reserves have reduced food imports, impacting the replenishment of supplies, as the country depends on imports for 80% of its food needs.

Food imports have decreased 21% in the first 6 months of 2022 compared to the same period in 2021, mainly due to a 39% decrease in imports of live animals and a 30% decrease in cereals. Wheat imports have also been impacted by Russia's war against Ukraine. The recent halting of exports may thus have another significant impact in Lebanon.

Subsidies provided by the government on essential food items have been lifted, except for wheat used to produce staple pita bread, which still has witnessed an 8.6-fold increase in price, compared to October 2019.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 74 million have been allocated to Lebanon in 2022, including a EUR 5 million top-up to address the consequences of the Russian war of aggression against Ukraine, in particular in the food security sector. EUR 43 million are used to fund direct multi-purpose cash transfers (MPCT) for Syrian refugees and Lebanese households who are not included in the Government's social safety net.

DG ECHO allocated EUR 100 000 to the 2022 Multi-Sector Needs Assessment (MSNA), implemented by REACH/IMPACT.

#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- The European Union, Germany, and the United States of America are the most significant donors to WFP in Lebanon.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Improve targeting and review the transfer value addressing the need to reduce caseload, without jeopardising support to the most vulnerable and potentially increasing the transfer value (at present set at only 67% of the minimal survival basket).

The upcoming Vulnerability Assessment of Syrian Refugees (VASR), the Multi-Sectoral Needs Assessment (MSNA), and the IPC will provide more granular data and ensure a comparative analysis of all population groups in the country, allowing for better humanitarian decision-making.

- Advocate for an inclusive and needs-based social protection framework that allows for the poorest (and often illiterate) households to access services, including the stateless.

## Syria

### *Situation and evolution*

64% of the population is facing food insecurity (13.9 million), with 12 million facing acute food insecurity and 1.9 million people at risk of sliding into food insecurity. In August 2022 food prices in Syria were 36% higher than at the beginning of Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, and 85% higher compared to the same time last year. The costs of supply in Syria will increase by USD 1.7 million per month. In April 2022, The World Food Programme (WFP) was forced to reduce food rations to 995 kcal. The crisis is severely underfunded. Out of the USD 1.7 billion required under the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the Food Security sector, only USD 312 million (18.4%) has been received as of October 2022 leading to a funding gap of USD 1.39 billion (81.6%).

South-central Syria and Government of Syria (GoS) controlled areas (GCA) rely on Russia for their wheat supply. Between January and May 2022, the prices of wheat flour in GCA increased by 35% and cooking oil by 64%. On 19 September, the Central Bank of Syria (CBS) devalued the official exchange rate to SYP 01530153 015/USD while the "black market" rate reached SYP 10051005 100/USD. This is the second devaluation this year will likely further raise food prices due to a direct correlation between exchange rates and food prices, and as other key fundamentals (such as low agricultural production levels) remain unchanged. Northeast Syria (NES) controlled by the Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) has not reported any major food shortages and maintains flour reserves of 1 to 6 months. However, the replenishment of these may be hindered by the increased cost of flour imports, reduced relief flour, and the insufficient local wheat production which is at great risk due to the drought and poor climate conditions. Northwest Syria (NWS), controlled by the Syrian Interim Government (SIG) and the Syrian Salvation Government (SSG), where some 1.4 million people rely on WFP food assistance delivered cross-border, is heavily dependent on imports transiting through Turkey, many of which originate from Ukraine or Russia. The UN Security Council resolution 2 642 allowing cross-border assistance will come to an end on 10 January 2023. The continuation of the WFP response will be dependent on the possible renewal of the resolution at the UN Security Council in early 2023. The increase in fuel prices will have a knock-on effect on food costs as the cost of transporting food continues to rise.

### *Drivers*

Political conflict, economic collapse, the Lebanon financial crisis, war in Ukraine, the Covid-19 pandemic, climate change resulting in severe drought, water scarcity and historic low yields are the key drivers of food insecurity.

Syria is currently facing one of its worst water crises, severely impacting the population's access to both drinking and irrigation water directly impacting food security. In NES, wheat production for the 2020-2021 season was at 1.045 MT, down from 2.8 MT in 2020 and from 4.1 MT before 2011. The forecast for 2022 is expected to be in a similar range. The seasonal outlook for October-December 2022 suggests below-normal precipitation and above-normal temperatures potentially leading to further deterioration of drought.

In GCA, it is expected that the Syrian Pound will continue to depreciate. In NWS, price increases, insufficient reserves, and the inability of the SIG or SSG to set up and implement a fully-fledged food security policy will continue to have adverse effects.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 135 million initially allocated in 2022 with EUR 15 million top-up in November 2022 to address the rising food insecurity. Approximately 51% of the total budget is contributing directly to food security: in-kind food-basket distributions, cash assistance, livelihoods and approximately 15% of ECHO budget allocated to early recovery activities. DG ECHO has been advocating with the Government of Syria and the Central Bank of Syria to introduce an adjustable preferential rate for INGOs and UN agencies in order to compensate for the depreciation of the Syrian pound and hyperinflation. DG ECHO organised an event on food assistance and food security in the margin of the 6<sup>th</sup> Brussels conference on Supporting the Future of Syria and the Region, trying to mobilise donor support for a better coordinated response.


#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- DG NEAR: Additional allocation of EUR 10 million for food/livelihoods is being negotiated with selected INGOs partners in close coordination with DG ECHO.

### *Needs and opportunities*


- Prioritise funding of immediate lifesaving response to vulnerable Syrians, with focus on food and nutrition assistance as well as early recovery interventions.
- Advocate with other EU services and donors for increased engagement on Syria for integrated programming that boosts ability of people to earn a living. Livelihoods programmes, including agricultural projects, market strengthening, job creation and restoration of basic services.
- Develop strategies to operate in context of high inflation and currency depreciation supporting hybrid modalities balancing cash and in-kind assistance.
- Strengthen humanitarian cash and shock responsive mechanisms.

### Syria's compounded economic crisis (2019-2022)




Source: Whole of Syria Food Security Sector

### Exchange rates (formal (official) and informal) and food price trends



Source: WFP Syria, October 2022



## Yemen

### Situation and evolution

IPC updated analysis – still to be published - indicates that for the period October to December 2022, approximately 17 million people or over half of the population analysed in Yemen, will experience high levels of Acute Food Insecurity (AFI), classified as Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and Emergency (IPC Phase 4). The primary concern is the 6.1 million people classified in IPC Phase 4, one Phase away from starvation. This analysis update indicates a slight improvement in the food security situation compared with the previous projection (June to December 2022), where over 19 million (60%) people were highly food insecure, including over 160 000 classified in IPC Phase 5, Catastrophe. The updated analysis shows that while IPC Phase 5, Catastrophe has been reversed and prevented, more than half of the population remains acutely food insecure – with over 6 million people still classified in IPC Phase 4, Emergency. When comparing current number of people facing acute food insecurity between January-May 2022 of 17.4 million to the updated projection of 17 million, it can be considered that very limited change of the food security situation will occur by the end of 2022 compared to the beginning of the year. Yemen remains one of the most food insecure countries in the world. For nearly a decade – even before the war – more than half of the population has consistently been food insecure, mainly driven by structural instability aggravated by human-induced factors and climate change. This analysis, therefore, emphasises that the slight improvement is a temporary reprieve and further efforts need to be put in place to sustain and completely reverse this trend that has been persistent for over a decade.

Prior to the conflict in Ukraine, the national average price of wheat had already risen by 246.7% from 122 Yemeni Rials (YER) per kilo in 2014 to 423 YER per kilo in September 2021. Between January and September 2022, wheat flour prices have increased by another 66% in the Internationally Recognised Government (IRG) area, while it has increased by 12% in the Houthis controlled areas. The Survival Minimum Expenditure Basket (SMEB) cost has increased in the same period, especially in the south of Yemen. As wheat imports from India have been recognised as a key supply line for Yemen, the IRG on 4 August reported that wheat has been secured to cover two and half months of consumption, with 176 400 MT of wheat available for August–September. Moreover, the HSG Group, Yemen's largest wheat importing company announced that it has secured 250 000 MT of wheat, sufficient to supply the market until mid-October.

The Yemen crisis is still underfunded, even if the appeal is now covered at 53.1% (vs. 45% in



September), due to recent additional funding from the US and the EU. In 2021, an additional pledging conference was organised in the margins of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) during which over USD 600 million was raised. This year however, no second pledging event is foreseen. Out of the USD 2.1 billion required under the 2022 Humanitarian Response Plan (HRP) for the Food Security sector, funding received is just over USD 1 billion (compared to USD 985 million in the previous month).

The funding gap is forcing the World Food Programme (WFP) to further cut food rations. WFP will likely scale down their caseload from 13 million to 10.5 million, geographically targeting IPC Phases 4 districts as well as 'the most vulnerable' population in IPC Phase 3.

Reduced rations and suspension of assistance are dangerously becoming the new norm. The Food Security actors will inevitably no longer meet the standards of humanitarian food assistance. The result could be malnutrition and further impoverishment.

### *Drivers*

The economic crisis (effects of low incomes, depreciation of the Yemeni currency and irregular or non-payment of salaries of civil servants), continuous conflict, reduced access to basic services and low humanitarian food assistance are the key drivers of food insecurity. The Russian war of aggression against Ukraine is also contributing to the deterioration of the food security situation in Yemen. Yemen is 90% dependent on food imports, with 46% of wheat coming from Russia and Ukraine.

Restrictions and obstructions of access to services and assistance are major aggravating factors for the functioning of the humanitarian response and the private sector hampered by limited volumes of imports. The recent UN-brokered truce (started on 2 April and renewed until 2 October 2022) has led to a reduction of hostilities and a temporary increase of fuel imports allowed into the north of Yemen. As the truce was not extended after 2<sup>nd</sup> of October, it remains unclear whether the hostilities will resume or not. If fighting resumes, access will be further limited impacting the import of basic commodities by the private sector. In the meantime, prices continue to rise, especially in the south of Yemen.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 170 million allocated in 2022, including additional allocation of EUR 35 million mobilised through the Solidarity and Emergency Aid Reserve (SEAR), to address the food security crisis (through Food and Cash). This means that approx. 80% of the budget contributing directly (Food Security 34%) and indirectly (health and nutrition 21%, basic needs/Multipurpose Cash Assistance (MPCA) 16%, WASH 6% and DRR 3.5%) to food security outcomes. DG ECHO provides aid mainly through cash and in-kind deliveries.
- The EU is a leading actor on diplomacy and coordinated humanitarian advocacy. On 23 June 2022, DG ECHO co-hosted the fourth humanitarian Senior Official Meeting jointly with Sweden (SOM process), where the food insecurity crisis and related drivers were emphasised and action points for collective action identified.


#### **Other actors' main interventions**

- USAID/BHA: USD 1 billion was allocated in 2022 alone (including a significant part of food in-kind). This is already above 2021 (USD 800 million) and 2020 (USD 600 million).

### Needs and opportunities

- Underfunded crisis. Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Improve prioritisation of assistance ensuring greater coverage for the most vulnerable groups.
- Continue to play a leading role in coordination and advocacy for the respect of IHL, principled aid delivery and increased assistance to Yemen.
- Advocate both internally to other Commission services and externally to donors for increased engagement on Yemen.
- Develop specific strategies to operate in context of high inflation and depreciation (e.g., flexible programming, market monitoring and contingency planning).
- Strengthen the humanitarian cash and shock responsive social protection (SRSP) nexus as well as livelihood support and diversification, inter-sectoral programming and monitoring and early warning systems.

#### Acute Food Insecurity Projection October – December 2022



Source: IPC Yemen, July 2022

# Funding progress by sector in Yemen


## Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2022

<https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1077/summary>





### Funding progress by cluster

19-Oct-2022



Not specified: US\$187,446,829

Multiple clusters/sectors (shared): US\$96,604,391




## Yemen Humanitarian Response Plan 2022



<https://fts.unocha.org/appeals/1077/summary>

### Trends in response plan/appeal requirements

19-Oct-2022



Amounts shown for the current year (far right bar) are for the year to date. No data is shown in years where there was no plan/appeal.

[Show more](#)

## 2.4. Latin America and Caribbean

### Central America

#### Situation and evolution

Food insecurity in the region, in particular in the Dry Corridor (consisting of parts of Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua) is aggravating. In 2021, a total of 8.4 million people were suffering of food insecurity (IPC 3 and 4), including an estimated 500 000 in Nicaragua. According to WFP, 8 in 10 households in the Dry Corridor are resorting to crisis coping mechanisms and more than 25% of the population do not have enough money to buy basic foods.

Guatemala and Honduras are the two countries with the largest needs, with 6.6 million people in need of food assistance (OCHA, HNO 2021). FAO/WFP's outlook for June-September 2022 (Hunger Hotspots) states that the situation in Honduras and Guatemala requires close monitoring, as their agricultural sectors are significantly exposed to elevated international food and agricultural supply prices during the lean season (March-August). Potential storms in the hurricane season impacts could aggravate an already-dire food and nutrition situation in Northern and Central America (Fewsnet)<sup>6</sup>.

The main needs in the Dry Corridor are food assistance and supplementary nutrition for children under 5, as for pregnant and lactating women. In addition, people need livelihoods' protection and support in their recovery.

<sup>6</sup> <https://fews.net/>

## Guatemala

The situation in Guatemala is particularly worrisome as food insecurity has known a 6-fold increase since 2013, with 24 % of it's the population food insecure. In addition, around 47% of children under 5 are being affected by chronic malnutrition (UNICEF) and 16 611 cases of acute malnutrition and 46 deaths in children under five from January to September 2022 (Ministry of Health, October 2022). This is the highest rate in Latin America and the Caribbean and is the 6th highest rate of chronic malnutrition or stunting in the world (WFP, August 2022).

According to IPC projection, the number of people experiencing high level of acute food insecurity (IPC3 or above) and in need of assistance has reached 4.6 million (26% of the total population) in September 2022 and expected to decrease to 3.2 million people for the period of October 2022 to February 2023. WFP estimates that more than 100 000 Guatemalans suffer from severe food insecurity, IPC4 (WFP, October 2022). Children are particularly vulnerable. The different projection didn't take into account the impact of meteorological hazard as from April to mid-October 2022 and particularly more than 4.8 million people have been affected by consecutive rains (Some 851 000 people in Guatemala have been affected by Tropical Storm Julia).

The main drivers are high food and transport prices, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine causing high prices in fertilisers (an increase of 85% since 2021), the depletion of basic grain reserves, the loss of jobs and income and the COVID-19 pandemic consequences.

The purchasing power of households continues to be negatively affected by international trends. In June, the highest year-on-year inflation in eleven years (7.5 %) was reported. The inflationary trend is even higher in Alta and Baja Verapaz, with 9.7 %, and in Huehuetenango and Quiché, with 9.2%. The prices of white corn, black beans and rice are the highest recorded since 1998 (Ministry of Agriculture). Basic Food Basket data reveal that the price of edible oil increased 31.4 %, compared to the previous year. The National Statistics Institute (INE) indicates that a family of five needs USD 427.90 per month to purchase the Basic Food Basket, while the average minimum wage is USD 267. 40% of the households spent more than 50% of their income on food.

Acción Contra la Hambre (ACH)'s forecasting system, PREDISAN, forecasts that 4% of Guatemala's population would be in a zone of concern of very high food security and up to 40% in a high zone.

## Honduras

According to IPC, over 2.6 million people (28% of the population analysed) are in Crisis or worse (IPC Phase 3 or above), requiring urgent action. Of these people, at least 1.9 million are in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) and 353 000 in Emergency (IPC Phase 4).

ACH's forecasting system, PREDISAN, forecasts that 14% of Honduras' population would be in a zone of concern of very high food security and up to 71% in a high zone, between June and September 2022.

Inflation has caused a deterioration in the purchasing power of the population, which currently depends mainly on purchases due to the annual lean season. Food prices increased with 6.3% and transport with 3.6%. The price of the Basic Food Basket increased with 5% since December 2021, with a 68% increase of maize, 23% of beans and 15% of oil.

With a seasonal decline in employment options in rural areas, access to food has been reduced, especially for the poorest households. Since they are reducing the number of daily meals, increasing the use of credit or third-party food support, and selling productive assets, they will be classified in Crisis (IPC Phase 3) until September.



## Drivers

Food insecurity is stemming from structural and systemic deficiencies, causing increasing poverty rates, linked to violence and climate change (26% population is at high climate risk). The connection between food insecurity, climate, and violence on the one side and (forced) migration on the other has been highlighted by some stakeholders in the region, such as WFP and ACH. CARE draws attention on the impact of gender inequality on food security.

Indeed, the aggravated food insecurity is mainly caused by an accumulation of impacts and simultaneous shocks, including El Niño, consecutive droughts, hurricanes Eta and Iota, coffee rust, socio-economic impact of COVID-19, ongoing inflation, violence, and the impact of the war on Ukraine. In the first semester of 2022, the cost of the food basket increased by more than 80%, %, while ongoing drought limits livelihood and harvest opportunities.

Atypically high prices are worsening the impact of the ongoing lean season. These prices, according to Fewsnet, will limit seasonal improvements in food availability, purchasing power, and access to food for very poor households who have yet to recover from the economic and climatic events of recent years. Poor households are expected to experience Stressed (IPC Phase 2) outcomes, while very poor households, in the Dry Corridor and areas affected by hurricanes Eta and Iota, face Crisis (IPC Phase 3) outcomes.

## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

- Since 1994, DG ECHO has allocated EUR 281 million to Central America, of which EUR 45 million were allocated to food security and nutrition, and EUR 91 million were allocated to Disaster Preparedness.
- In its current projects, DG ECHO focusses on the Dry Corridor, and particularly the areas mostly affected by the recent hurricanes Eta and Iota. It provides food assistance and short to medium-term livelihood recovery, while helping to build resilience within relevant nexus strategies. At the same time DG ECHO raises awareness on the prevailing food crisis through FSN information systems, through an action of EUR 1 million, implemented by OXFAM.
- EUR 5 million has been allocated to Central America to respond to the current crisis. Due to the rapid degradation of nutritional situation, nutritional data collection, surveillance and response will be also supported through new actions.
- The food assistance interventions target households in IPC phase 4 (Emergency) and households in IPC phase 3 (Crisis) that have additional constraints, like being a single parent household or having a poor food-consumption and asset base, having a high number of dependents, being displaced, etc. A special focus is given to children under five and pregnant women. DG ECHO supported 187 546 beneficiaries in Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Nicaragua with direct cash transfer, vouchers, and in-kind assistance.

### Other actors' main interventions:

The **European Union** is funding several development projects at regional level, which are related to food insecurity and resilience building in the sector:

- for EUR 6 million, the Information Systems Program for the Resilience of Food and Nutrition Security in the SICA Region (PROGRESAN-SICA), generating information for the development of public strategies and policies, with a focus on resilience of food and nutrition security (SAN). It is currently funded under the Climate Resilience of rural households in the Dry Corridor and managed as a component of the national programme in Nicaragua and ends in October 2023.

- for EUR 16.045 million, the Central American Program for Coffee Rust Integrated Management (PROCAGICA) is benefitting 330 000 family producers and 6 133 family farms in the selected areas in controlling the rust and avoiding severe damage to their plantations. Its activities will end at the end of 2022.
- for EUR 6 million, the AGRO-INNOVA for the adaptability of agro-forestry systems in the Central American Dry Corridor, aims to enhance capacities of 3 000 producers and 12 organisations in 6 countries on water harvest, bio-supplies production, forestry nurseries, planting nutrition and provision of drought-resistant varieties. Its activities will end in November 2023.

The European Union is funding several food related projects in Nicaragua:

- The European Union is funding the Boosting Rural and urban Economy in Times of Crisis and Beyond (BOOST) programme, providing incentives to sustain value chains related to the School Meals Programme in the context of a protracted socio-political crisis. It is aiming to contribute to reducing poverty and fostering the economic empowerment of women for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in January 2024.
- The EU is also funding the Climate Resilience of Rural Households in the Dry Corridor (Dry Corridor), by strengthening of the policy framework on climate change adaptation at the regional level (in particular, within the SICA system) and shock responsiveness mechanism and inclusive adaptability of safety nets with a focus on climate change, food and nutrition security and women's empowerment for EUR 13 million. These activities will end in August 2024.

The European Union is funding three food related projects in Guatemala:

- It funds an integral approach to build resilience in communities, vulnerable to food insecurity and climate shocks, called PRO-RESILIENCE, implemented by WFP for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end in 2025.
- It funds a comprehensive strategy to fight chronic malnutrition, through the support of the National Strategy for Prevention of Chronic Malnutrition, implemented by UNICEF for EUR 15 million. Its activities will end at the end of May 2024.
- Finally, it funds support to the Primary Health System to fight Chronic Malnutrition in Guatemala, implemented by PAHO for EUR 20 million. Its activities will end in November 2023.

In addition, the EU will adopt a new program with a total budget of EUR 14 million, aiming at strengthening budgetary execution at institutional level and public policy implementation capacities of the Ministries who are responsible for the fight against malnutrition. It will also strengthen the institutional capacity of the Ministry of Finance which supports them. Furthermore, the EU will strengthen food security in the most vulnerable regions of Guatemala and promote income generation, through the development of sustainable and climate-resilient agriculture, as well as alternative economic activities in rural areas.

**WFP** signed an agreement with the Ministry of Social Development (MIDES) to strengthen the Ministry's actions in food and nutrition security.


**USAID** announced funding to address food security and resilience in the LAC region.

- In Fiscal Year 2022, USD 21.8 million is dedicated for USAID/BHA food assistance operations in El Salvador, Honduras, and Guatemala. Activities include emergency food assistance, via cash transfers and multipurpose cash assistance, agricultural interventions, and livelihood support. Partners include WFP (El Salvador), World Vision and CRS (Guatemala), ADRA and CRS in Honduras.

- At the same time, nearly USD 92 million of emergency food assistance and related humanitarian programming, such as nutrition, health, and protection, as well as water, sanitation, and hygiene interventions has been announced for El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras (of which USD 87.5 million in emergency funding and USD 4.3 million in early recovery, risk reduction and resilience).
- USD 95 million of FY 2021 Feed the Future funds that will help smallholder farmers in Colombia, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Peru improve productivity of high- value horticulture crops, increase incomes, and bolster farmers' capacity to withstand shocks like higher fertiliser prices and impacts of climate change.

### Needs and opportunities

- The food security crisis in Central America remains severely underfunded. WFP reports a funding gap of 43% for its operations in Guatemala and 69% for Honduras.
- Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Partners are requested to further prioritise and target the most vulnerable individuals.
- Continue to advocate with other services and donors for an increased engagement in Central America's Dry Corridor.
- The Food security and Nutrition Information system support in Central America was recently finalised. No new support from the EU and other donors is foreseen for the moment, and this in a significantly changing context due to political and violent crises and the ongoing impact of the conflict in Ukraine.
- To improve the operationalisation of the nexus for Shock responsive social Protection and Anticipatory action, as well as the coordination between DP programs, Euroclima and resilience building programs.



Source: GUATEMALA: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot | March 2022 - February 2023<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup>[https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Guatemala\\_AcuteFoodInsec\\_2022Mar2023Feb\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar2023Feb_Snapshot_English.pdf)


### PROJECTION: Acute Food Insecurity | October 2022 - February 2023



### Projection Key Figures | Oct 2022 - Feb 2023




Over 3.2 million people (19% of the analyzed population of 17.6 million) are likely to experience high levels of acute food insecurity (IPC Phase 3 or above) in Guatemala between October 2022 and February 2023.



Source: GUATEMALA: IPC Acute Food Insecurity Snapshot | March 2022 - February 2023<sup>8</sup>


### Trend Analysis December 2020 - August 2022



Source: HONDURAS: IPC Food Security Phase Classification Snapshot | December 2021 - August 2022<sup>9</sup>

<sup>8</sup>[https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Guatemala\\_AcuteFoodInsec\\_2022Mar2023Feb\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Guatemala_AcuteFoodInsec_2022Mar2023Feb_Snapshot_English.pdf)

<sup>9</sup>[https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_2021Dec2022Aug\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_Acute_Food_Insec_2021Dec2022Aug_Snapshot_English.pdf)



Source: HONDURAS: IPC Food Security Phase Classification Snapshot | December 2021 - August 2022<sup>10</sup>

## Colombia

### Situation and evolution

In 2021, 39.3% of Colombians (19.6 million persons) were below the monetary poverty line with a monthly income per capita of only 354 000 Colombian pesos (EUR 80.5). Furthermore, the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC) projects that in Colombia total poverty will be 1.7% higher than 2021 due to inflation. Extreme poverty affects disproportionately ethnic minorities, including indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities, usually located in former conflict zones with little state presence. About 7.3 million Colombian residents are estimated to have food security related humanitarian needs in 2022, while moderate and severe food insecurity is affecting 42% of the resident population (21.4 million), with severe food insecurity having slightly improved since the end of 2021 (FAO-WFP). As of July 2022, 75.7% of Colombian households ate three meals a day compared to 85.5% before the COVID-19 pandemic (DANE); 23.2% of households ate twice a day (30% in July 2021) and 1.1% only once. Moreover, 10.8% of children under 5 years of age suffer from chronic malnutrition. In addition to Colombians, 60% of Venezuelan migrants and refugees (1.08 million) living in Colombia were estimated to be food insecure (FAO-WFP) in the first half of 2022. Food insecurity among migrants and refugees is aggravated by significant levels of internal displacement and accelerating food inflation. The data shows a slight improvement in the situation from two years ago, when 73% were food insecure; however, the price of hot meals has increased by 60% by August 2022 (WFP).

<sup>10</sup>[https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user\\_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC\\_Honduras\\_Acute\\_Food\\_Insec\\_2021Dec2022Aug\\_Snapshot\\_English.pdf](https://www.ipcinfo.org/fileadmin/user_upload/ipcinfo/docs/IPC_Honduras_Acute_Food_Insec_2021Dec2022Aug_Snapshot_English.pdf)



Due to the combined effect of inflation stemming from COVID-19 related restrictions and the crisis in Ukraine, food prices have increased by an average of 23.6% between February 2021 and June 2022 with an annual inflation of 9.7% and 139% increase of fertiliser prices (DANE). Colombia imports an estimated 75% of its fertiliser (approximately half from Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine), and approximately 28% of its food commodities. Increasing food prices and shortages of agricultural inputs have a significant negative impact on low-income communities in the country, such as Venezuelan migrants and refugees.

### *Drivers*

Persistent violence among non-state armed groups and recurring natural disasters in Colombia continue to cause internal displacement and limit Colombians' ability to access crops, livelihoods, essential goods, and services, thus exacerbating food insecurity and nutrition issues among vulnerable households. Additionally, the COVID-19 pandemic and related mitigation measures lead to reduced access to health and protection services, worsening food insecurity.

In addition, approximately 2.3 million Venezuelan migrants and refugees have sought refuge in Colombia, along with more than 980 000 Colombian returnees. These factors have strained local services and increased humanitarian needs, including food, health, livelihoods, nutrition, protection, shelter, and water, sanitation, and hygiene (WASH), not only among migrants, refugees, and returnees, but also host communities in both rural and urban areas. Furthermore, other aggravating factors are worsening the current situation, such as loss of agricultural livelihoods and reduction of agricultural productive capacity due to the increase in the costs of production (15-35%).

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**

- DG ECHO interventions focus on the immediate risks of the most vulnerable and affected populations on prioritised sectors like protection, health, education in emergencies and nutrition. Those are sectors where DG ECHO has a real added value in complementarity and coordination to other donors. Food security interventions are prioritised under rapid response mechanisms.
- Over EUR 84 million has been allocated by DG ECHO to the Food Security Sector in Colombia between 1994 and 2022, representing 23% of total allocations. Food assistance remains greatly underfunded in both the HRP (funding gap 68%) and RMRP (funding gap 69%).

### *Needs and opportunities*

- Need to improve the triple nexus with EU Delegation and Member States for a more holistic response to the needs (from humanitarian protection, health, EiE response to economic inclusion, support from social protection systems and documentation from development programs).
- Expanding food security and nutrition assessment to also include Colombian populations nationwide, also remote areas. The idea is to perform an IPC in Colombia in 2022 in order to have more precise figure about needs and priority area.
- Improve DG ECHO-funded project CASH response.

## **Haiti**

### *Situation and evolution*


In Haiti, the last IPC data (October 2022) shows a considerable deterioration of the food security situation. Regarding the number of people in need of assistance (IPC phase 3 and above), the number of 4.33 million recorded in 2021 increased to 4.7 million in 2022 (i.e., nearly half of the population is experiencing high levels of acute food insecurity) representing an increase of 8.5%. For households classified in emergency (IPC Phase 4), the number increased from 1.33 million to 1.77 million, an increase of 33% also the number of areas classified in the said phase (Phase 4 of the IPC) increased from five in September 2021 to fifteen in September 2022. The situation is particularly worrying due to the registration of approximately 0.3 % of households (i.e., 19 200 people) in phase 5 of the IPC (Catastrophe) in Cite Soleil. Increasing insecurity and gangs 'territorial control' prevents household access to livelihood opportunities and markets. Haiti imports 70 % of its food commodities. The increase in global food prices due to the war in Ukraine, the annual inflation standing at 29% (July 2022), the scarcity of fuel leading to higher transport costs and commodity prices and the depreciation of the Haitian national currency (nearly 22% in one year) will likely further diminish household purchasing power. The latest assessment by the Ministry of Public Health and Population (MSPP) and UNICEF in the commune of Cité Soleil (one of the most affected by gang violence), concludes that approximately 20% of children under the age of five are suffering from severe or moderate acute malnutrition.

For over a year now, 3.5 million people living in Southern departments, still recovering from the effects of the August 2021 earthquake, are deeply impacted by the blockage of roads departing from Port-au-Prince by gangs. This prevents farmers to sell their production in the markets of the capital and to receive humanitarian assistance, forcing vulnerable households to adopt negative coping strategies to meet basic needs (OCHA).

### *Drivers*

The food insecurity situation is expected to deteriorate further in the coming months, due to the water deficit during the spring agricultural campaign, a poor coverage of acute needs during past food and nutrition crises, the rising food and fuel prices (linked to the war in Ukraine), the depreciation of the national currency, the political instability, the impacts of the 2021 earthquake, continued high inflation and the gang violence (continuing to increase in 2022 compared to 2021) that is causing displacement, market disruptions, limit humanitarian access and exacerbate the economic crisis.

The country's level of structural vulnerability and the accumulation of stressors also explain why many households are extremely sensitive to shocks (climate hazards, rising prices, crop losses, etc.) and are particularly vulnerable to food insecurity.



Source: *Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update*

## Ongoing interventions

### ECHO interventions

The 2022 HIP first EUR 6 million allocation of Humanitarian assistance was devoted to respond to protection, health and education needs and priorities. In May 2022, a EUR 5 million top up was approved to provide emergency food assistance, such as the provision of cash for food, food vouchers, and in-kind food assistance to communities under the most acute food needs (IPC 4). The strategy included response in urban areas and complemented the WFP's Social Protection program. From the de-committed funds from the European Development Fund for humanitarian food assistance in the most vulnerable countries in Africa, Caribbean, and the Pacific; EUR 6.5 million have been allocated to Haiti, proposals have been received and are under discussion. The latter will be focused on areas with identified population on IPC 5 and high concentration of population in IPC 4 in order to prevent further deterioration of the food crisis.

### Other actors' main interventions


- Geographic concentration of the EU and Member States initiatives in Northwest and Grand Anse, (both classified in IPC 3 and 4) jointly respond to food insecurity and malnutrition due to the impact of drought and hurricane Matthew as well as last year's earthquake.

## Needs and opportunities

- Severely underfunded crisis (HRP 2022 only 14% funded as of August 2022). Additional short and long-term financial support is required.
- Advocating with other services and donors for increased engagement in Haiti is necessary.
- Promote additional nutritional assessments to have sufficient information of the nutrition status of children under the age of 5.
- Concerns related to the accelerated devaluation of the currency against the dollar and the high cost of living have a great impact on the amount of cash transfers and

it is therefore necessary to monitor the markets and adapt ECHO intervention in coordination with the Cash Working Group.

- Maximising Nexus with the EU Delegation under the upcoming EDF de-committed funds allocation to improve coordination via a joint analysis of needs to promote complementarities at geographical level, be support shock responsive, and ensure the implementation of social protection and anticipatory actions.



Source: IPC, October 2022

## Venezuela

### Situation and evolution

The estimated number of food insecure people ranges between 14.4 and 18.5 million, according to figures from HumVenezuela. 80.6% of households (23.1 million people) can't buy quality food and in sufficient quantities. 13.4 million people (46.7%) have lost their source of income and 5 million people (17.7%) exhausted their means of life. Venezuelan migrants and refugees displaced abroad amount to 6.1 million as of April 2022, with forecasts for 3.5 million in need of food assistance in 2022 (Regional Refugee and Migrant Response Plan, RMRP - Plataforma de Coordinación Interagencial para Refugiados y Migrantes, R4V – 2022). Venezuela is importing 75% of the food it needs and is therefore affected by shortages on the international market. Additionally, the World Bank assessment indicated that inflation stands at 155%. In 2021, the extreme poverty rate and the poverty rate were at 76.6% and 95.4% respectively (National Household Survey). There is a deficit of 95% of the minimum wage (USD 23) in relation to the basic basket of June 2022, which was USD 459.84, showing an increase of 5.05% compared to May 2022. Around USD 15 are needed per day to cover food costs, while the minimum salary is estimated at USD 16 per month.

## *Drivers*

The war in Ukraine, added to pre-existing political and economic factors, that have weakened the lives and livelihoods of the population, exacerbates the crisis. In the period 2014-2020 the GDP shows an accumulated reduction of 74%, thus a significant decrease in potential production capacity and productivity in the country (ENCOVI). Moreover, the poverty and extreme poverty rate of the Venezuelan population is 95.4% and 76.6% respectively.

Russian food imports dependency and fuel scarcity affected 1.2 million tonnes of wheat, 80% of fertilisers imported. Lack of financing and sufficient income and increased fuel prices, as well as limited access to seeds also have an impact.

Increasing insecurity and violence due to the conflicts between armed groups and the dispute to control the territory continue to affect food insecurity in the country. Lastly, extreme weather has increased flooding in recent years, resulting in loss of food crops. Climatic variations have also altered cycles, making it difficult to take advantage of rainy periods for irrigation and the water public service has severe deficiencies.

## *Ongoing interventions*

### **ECHO interventions**

- EUR 20.15 million allocated inside Venezuela in 2022 for all HIP priorities under the initial allocation, EUR 6 million under a second (Operational Reserve) allocation and EUR 30 million (new funds allocated and currently under discussion with partners, to respond to basic needs inside Venezuela and to Venezuelan migrants' acute needs outside Venezuela). DG ECHO is funding WFP operations implemented in schools in Venezuela which focus on food assistance. Other key partners such as NRC also work with schools in EiE complementing with food security interventions.

### **Other actors' main interventions**

In a true nexus approach, the EU continues to support food availability through the promotion of the development of associative schemes. Through a second project, they are also supporting family farming through the reinforcement of food production capacities.

## *Needs and opportunities*

- The funding received for the HRP Venezuela (in-country) 2021 only covered 37% of the required funds.
- The lack of official data to support the humanitarian crisis (particularly on the ongoing food and nutrition crisis) hinders the visibility of the situation and the access to funds to attend the needs of the most vulnerable population. Thus, DG ECHO needs to make the humanitarian crisis in Venezuela visible and increase advocacy with donors, including in a nexus approach.
- The work of FAO on food production and support to family farming gives a real opportunity for nexus with ongoing DG ECHO funded EiE and food security response project throughout school feeding.
- The impossibility of developing cash interventions in Venezuela for a year and a half, prevents reaching a greater number of people in need.



## 2.5. Asia and Pacific

### **Afghanistan**

#### *Situation and evolution*

Food security continues to remain at critical levels in Afghanistan. The Sept. 2022 Global Network Against Food Crisis (GNAFS) outlook includes Afghanistan amongst the highest concern hotspots with catastrophic conditions. The severity of food insecurity suggests that significant loss of life may already be occurring as nearly 6 million people are expected to be in Emergency.

All 34 provinces are facing crisis or emergency levels of acute food insecurity; The latest WFP SITREP (15/09) confirms IPC figures of 18.9 million people – nearly half of the population - currently acutely food insecure (IPC 3+), of which 13 million in IPC Phase 3 (Crisis), and 6 million in IPC Phase 4 (Emergency). IPC Phase 5 (Catastrophe) conditions affected approximately 20,000 people between March and May in the province of Ghor. Afghanistan has the highest prevalence of insufficient food consumption globally, with 92% of people experiencing insufficient food consumption for ten consecutive months. 60% of households are reported to employ crisis-level coping strategies such as selling assets, borrowing food, begging etc. Female headed households are struggling the most. 91% of the people's income is spent on food (the % rises to 95% for single female headed households).

Next IPC analysis expected to be endorsed by mid/end of Oct. 2022. More control over the process demanded by National Statistic and Information Authority (NSIA) might compromise reliability. Despite no face-to-face data collection and analysis of only secondary data from Whole of Afghanistan Assessment (WoAA) and phone survey, the IPC Technical Working Group concluded that the WoAA was sufficiently reliable for analysis for IPC as the same indicators are collected across the two surveys. Acute malnutrition to be included in the analysis.

In September, the Food Security and Agriculture Cluster (FSAC) has revised the standard food and livelihood assistance composition and values setting at USD 96 the cash equivalent to the food assistance basket. The Cash Working Group (CWG) adjusted the Transfer Value for Multi-Purpose Cash Transfer to USD 180 based on updated value of MEB.

WFP managed to consistently scale-up its operation to a cumulative of 21.92 million people reached from January to August 2022. However, if no additional funding is secured WFP will have to reduce food rations and/or reduce coverage in IPC 3 areas. (*WFP Partner briefing meeting Sept. 2022*).

As of 19 October 2022, the OCHA Financial Tracking System (OCHA FTS) indicates a total of USD 2.02 billion, 45% of the total USD 4.4 billion required. Food Security and Agriculture has received USD 819 million out of a total requirement of USD 2.6 billion, therefore the sector is only 34% covered.

#### *Drivers*

Limited access to food is compounded by several factors: a devastating economic crisis (according to the World Bank the real GDP per capita may decline by around 34% between end-2020 and end-2022), (declined by 21% in 2021 alone). After months of high volatility, during the past couple of months, the exchange rate of AFG is stabilising. Access to cash, for the population and for humanitarian actors, remain very difficult. International assistance, beyond humanitarian, is resuming at a very slow pace. Sanctions and frozen Afghan Central Bank assets are continuing to play a negative role. More expensive financial services from hawala system, MoneyGram, and WesternUnion.

Remittances, that in 2020 represented USD 787 million, 4% of the GDP and a source of income for 10% of Afghan households, are reduced particularly in urban areas. Payment of salaries of civil servants are irregular. Prices of food commodities have increased, in particular vegetable oil, cereals, sugar, and pulses seem the most difficult products to obtain. The Ukrainian crisis impacts on the cost of humanitarian operations in the region, in particular in terms of food support.

The World Meteorological Organisation predicts that *la Niña* conditions will persist for three consecutive years, resulting in below-average rainfall during the upcoming September to February period, coinciding with the wheat-planting and mid-growing season. In addition, expected warmer-than-average temperatures and potential low snowpack in winter could reduce water availability for irrigation. This will come on top of two consecutive dry seasons since late 2020. Livestock conditions are very critical with risk of additional severe loss of livestock during winter. (ACAPS and GNAFC Sept. 22). Humanitarian actors have requested the Famine Early Warning Systems Network (FEWSNET) to set up and roll out an early warning system for 2023.

### *Ongoing interventions*

#### **ECHO interventions**


- In the context of the Afghanistan pledging conference that took place on 31 March, Commissioner Lenarčič announced a total EU pledge of EUR 113 million (EUR 93 million for Afghanistan and the rest for the region) in new humanitarian funding.
- Breakdown per sectors: food assistance (32%), health and nutrition (27%), Education in Emergencies (18%) and protection and mine action (15%), other humanitarian services (8%).
- As of 5 September, DG ECHO has deployed a total EUR 114 million, in the region. This includes the EUR 113 million humanitarian funding reported above plus EUR 1 million mobilised through the Acute Large Emergency Response Tool (ALERT) following the earthquake that struck the country on 22 June.
- In addition, since September 2021 and as of 12 October 2022, 24 Humanitarian Air Bridge flights departed from Europe to Afghanistan carrying approx. 775 tonnes of mainly medical and nutritional goods. Two additional HABs are in the pipeline to be deployed by 10 December 2022. The EU is an important player in Afghanistan, it is one of the very few donors who has maintained a physical presence in the country. The DG ECHO field office has never interrupted its activities and continues to carry out monitoring missions across the country.

#### **Other actor's main interventions**

- As of mid-October, OCHA FTS, USA is the first donor with USD 516.8 million, which represents 22% of the overall funding response plan/appeal while the UK is the second donor, with USD 409.5 million (17.6%) and the Asian Development Bank, the third one, with USD 380 million (16.3%). On 23 September 2022 the USA pledged an additional USD 327 million of humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan.
- At the time of the Pledging Conference (31/03), the EU plus Member States pledged and equivalent to USD 586 million.

### *Needs and opportunities*

- To continue to be able to address the most urgent needs, WFP needs additional funding of USD 1.1 billion between August 2022 and January 2023. USD 172 million is needed to ensure the ability to preposition 151 000 Metric Tonnes by November 2022, and to cover emergency needs for 2.2 million people. USD 220 million per month are needed to sustain WFP operations.



Source: Global Report on Food Crises 2022, Mid-year update

## **GETTING IN TOUCH WITH THE EU**

### **In person**

All over the European Union there are hundreds of Europe Direct information centres. You can find the address of the centre nearest you at: [https://europa.eu/european-union/contact\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en)

### **On the phone or by email**

Europe Direct is a service that answers your questions about the European Union. You can contact this service:

- by freephone: 00 800 6 7 8 9 10 11 (certain operators may charge for these calls),
- at the following standard number: +32 22999696, or
- by email via: [https://europa.eu/european-union/contact\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en)

## **FINDING INFORMATION ABOUT THE EU**

### **Online**

Information about the European Union in all the official languages of the EU is available on the Europa website at: [https://europa.eu/european-union/index\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/index_en)

### **EU publications**

You can download or order free and priced EU publications from: <https://op.europa.eu/en/publications>. Multiple copies of free publications may be obtained by contacting Europe Direct or your local information centre (see [https://europa.eu/european-union/contact\\_en](https://europa.eu/european-union/contact_en)).

### **EU law and related documents**

For access to legal information from the EU, including all EU law since 1952 in all the official language versions, go to EUR-Lex at: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu>

### **Open data from the EU**

The EU Open Data Portal (<http://data.europa.eu/euodp/en>) provides access to datasets from the EU. Data can be downloaded and reused for free, for both commercial and non-commercial purposes.

